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FORMATION OF CONTRACTS -- A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE
OF LEGAL SYSTEMS: INTRODUCTION
Editor's Note:
A two-volume work, embodying the results of ten years of re-
search conducted under the auspices of the General Principles of
Law Project of the Cornell Law School, was published in 1968.
The work, published by Oceana Publications, Inc. (Dobbs Ferry,
New York) and by Stevens & Sons (London), is entitled "Formation
of Contracts -- A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems."
The authors of the study are renowned lawyers and law
teachers in the United States, Europe, Asia and Australia:
Pierre G. Bonassies, Gino Gorla, Hans Leyser, Werner Lorenz,
Ian R. Macneil, Karl H. Neumayer, Ishwar C. Saxena, Rudolf B.
Schlesinger and W. J. Wagner.
The general editor of the work is Rudolf B. Schlesinger,
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and Com-
parative Law at Cornell University Law School. Professor
Schlesinger's introduction to the two volumes explains the back-
ground and methodology of the pioneering approach to comparative
research, used for the first time in the Cornell Project. As
that approach is certain to have important ramifications in the
whole field of international legal studies, the Journal is
proud to reprint this introduction. Following the introduction,
the reader will find a list of reviews and review articles,
published to date, which discuss the substance and methodology
of the work.
The editors thank Professor Schlesinger and the publishers
for their permission to reprint the introduction in the Journal.
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Parts III & IV of the Introduction are not reproduced here.
In the text and especially in the footnotes the Introduction
contains numerous cross-references. These point to other pages and
sections in the book, and not in this Journal.
I THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY -- A FIRST ORIENTATION
The work presented herewith has grown out of a research pro-
ject carried on during the last ten years at the Law School of
Cornell University. The project was launched with a view to ascer-
taining, in an important area of the law of contracts, the extent
to which there exists common ground, or a common core, among a
major portion of the world's legal systems. From the very be-
ginning the over-all aim has been a twofold one: (1) to enhance
professional knowledge in the selected area of contract law by
finding and formulating the common ground as well as the differences
among legal systems, and (2) to test the feasibility of the research
method developed and used in the course of the Cornell Project.
This research method, to be analyzed below (under II),
should be viewed in the light of the previous state of the art.
Much of the comparative research undertaken by legal scholars in
the past was severely limited in at least one of several ways:
either the number of legal systems taken into consideration was
very small, ordinarily restricted to two; or the topic chosen for
comparative exploration was too narrow to permit the discovery,
withirf each of the legal systems selected, of the functional and
systematic interrelationship among a large number of precepts and
concepts. True, there were some previous projects which covered
a relatively broad subject and a considerable number of legal sys-
tems; but these projects as a rule were limited to the compilation
and juxtaposition of the various solutions found, without pro-
ceeding to the further step of comparison.
The difference between juxtaposition and true comparison is
a crucial one for all those who study legal phenomena observed in
more than one legal system. When a study is focused on the style,
the sources, the methods or generally the approach of several legal
systems, the similarities and dissimilarities often are so obvious
to the trained eye that mere juxtaposition becomes an implicit
comparison; indeed, mere description of a foreign approach may some-
times imply a comparison with certain elements in the reader's
own legal system. But where, as in the present Study, attention is
directed, not to fundamental matters of style or approach, but to
details of what the French call le fond du droit, then similarities
and dissimilarities between legal systems are apt to be complex and
intertwined; thus, even after the solutions 6ffered by the various
systems are neatly juxtaposed, their comparison still requires an
additional explicit step. This step, it is submitted, involves
at the very least the identification and formulation of elements of
similarity as well as dissimilarity.
1
The last statement may be a truism; but as applied to the
work of legal scholars, the consequences of the truism are not
always clearly recognized. The legal solutions to be compared
normally are expressed in terms of formulated standards, principles,
rules, tendencies and factors. Thus it would seem that the legal
scholar, if he wishes to engage in comparison rather than mere
juxtaposition, must strive to delineate areas of agreement and dis-
agreement, and to do so in terms of formulated standards, principles,
2
rules, tendencies and factors. Only in this way is it possible
to grasp the common core of the legal systems considered, and
clearly to discern the borders beyond which the common core does
not extend.
3
To serve the practical and academic purposes set forth
below (seeII(l)), such common core research should be aimed at
a whole field (or at least at a substantial, separable part of a
field) rather than a single narrow topic. From the inception of
1Traditionally, comparative legal writings have tended to
dwell more heavily on differences than on similarities. There is
no justification for such a one-sided approach, even though diff-
erences perhaps are more easily discovered and stated than sim-
ilarities. A sure knowledge of both is required in the light of
the purposes to be furthered by comparative legal research (see
II (1) below).
2Although, as stated in the text, the end-product of such
comparison is apt to be formulated, rather abstractly, in terms
of precepts and trends, the process of comparison may have to
be initiated by using an inductive (i.e., fact-oriented) method.
This point will be discussed infra, in Part 11(4) of the present
Introduction.
3After some initial wavering, the participants in the Cornell
Project gave preference to the term "common core" over other des-
criptive labels such as "general principles-of law recognized by
civilized nations." The reasons for this preference are explained
in the article by Schlesinger and Bonassies, Le fonds commun des
syst~mes juridigues--Observations sur un nouveauprojet de re-
cherches, 15 REV. INT. DR. CONP. 501, especially at 512-221963).
the Cornell Project it was felt, moreover, that for the same rea-
sons the Study should cover a sufficiently large number of well-
selected legal systems so that the ultimate results would have a
truly multinational validity and would permit inferences or working
hypotheses, subject to verification, even as to legal systems not
directly considered (see below at the end of II (3)).
Throughout, the attention of those participating in the
Project has been focused on what the law is, and not what it ought
to be. The results reached might be of interest tp.those who in
tle future will be called upon to codify and perhaps to unify the
law of formation of contracts 4; in a later part of this Introduc-
tion (at II(5)(b) below) an attempt will be made briefly to relate
some of these results to the Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods proposed by the Hague
Conference of April 1964. But the present Study itself was never
intended to arrive at proposals for legislative reform or uni-
fication of existing law. The participants in the Cornell Project
were not asked to prepare a treaty text or to draft a statute,
uniform or otherwise. They devoted their efforts exclusively to
the demarcation of the common core which de lege-lata exists
among legal systems. As in any broad-based discussion of the lex
lata, however, observable trends and directions of development were
noted.
It was clear from the outset that such a research undertaking,
aimed at finding and formulating a multinational "common core" in
a relatively wide area of the law, would pose almost unprecedented
difficulties. A generous grant which the Cornell Law School re-
ceived from the Ford Foundation made it possible to conduct a first
experiment involving this novel type of research.
"Formation of Contracts" was chosen as the subject of this
first experiment. 5 The confines of that subject, as understood
4See von Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz Uber die Verein-
heitlichung des Kaufrechts vom 2. bis 25. April 196-Die Ergeb-
nisse der Konferenz hinsichtlich der Vereinheitlichung des Rechts
des Abschlusses von KaufvertrAgen, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 101,
at 102 (1965).
5The reasons for this choice are discussed infra, in Part II
(2) of this Introduction.
for purposes of coverage in this Study, are set forth in the Scope
Note (pages 71-74 below).
The reader who uses these volumes primarily for the purpose
of obtaining information on some aspect of the law of formation of
contracts, will wish to turn to the main body of the -Study. A
quick reading of the hints inPart III of the present Introduction
will make it easier for him to find his way through the materials
of which the Study consists, and to appreciate the nature and
authorship of the various types of materials.
Some readers perhaps will be more interested in common core
research as a tool than in the specifics of the law of formation
of contracts. In order to enable such readers to derive as much
benefit as possible from the experience of the Cornell Project, and
in their own future research projects to adopt some of its
methods while avoiding the mistakes, an attempt will be made in
Part II of the Introduction to explain the way'in which the main
body of this Study has been developed.
II PROBLEMS OF COMMON CORE RESEARCH
ENCOUNTERED IN THIS STUDY*
(1) Purposes to be Served**
Common core research perhaps can be justified in the same
terms in which our colleagues in the natural sciences speak of
basic research. Quite possibly, the impulses flowing from the new
insights gained by such research will become fully apparent only
after a considerable body of knowledge has been collected in this
way; until then, even the direction of these impulses may not be
wholly predictable. As a practical matter, however, it must be
conceded that social scientists rarely refer to the-notion of
basic research, and that in any event they have not yet developed
*Most of the questions treated-in this part-of the Intro-
duction have been discussed by the author and-others in-previously
published articles. To minimize unnecessary repetition, the dis-
cussion which follows will be kept as brief'as possible, and ref-
erences will be provided to the-more extensiveprevious writings.
**For-more extensive treatment of this topic-see the arti-
cles listed in the bibliographical-part (Part*IV) of this Intro-
duction, under A (1), infra p. 62.
any criteria for the evaluation of such research. In the opinion
of most of his peers, it may thus be incumbent upon a legal scholar,
as on any other social scientist, to justify his research under-
takings by pointing to concrete purposes for which, predictably,
the fruits of his efforts may be used.
(a) PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
Turning to the clearly discernible potential uses of the re-
sults of common core research, one must keep in mind, first of
all, the future educational needs of the legal profession. The
researches conducted or initiated today will provide the materials
for the courses to be taken, and the textbooks to be read, by the
law students of tomorrow--by students, in other words, who will
expect to practice and to serve their clients more than a gen-
eration hence. In spite of the dangers of prophecy, the researcher
of today thus is forced to reach for his crystal-ball and to conjure
up an image, however cloudy, of the environment in which these
future clients and their legal advisers will have to operate.
Almost certainly it will not be an environment of general
uniformity of laws. In a world moving in the direction of plural-
ism and tending to affirm the values of diversity and mutual tol-
erance, we cannot expect monotonous unification of law. No doubt
some progress ill be made toward coordination and harmonization
of legal systems; but their basic diversity will long remain a
feature of the legal landscape. At the same time, it is predic-
table that for the legal practitioner of the future, and for his
dients, national frontiers will not have much greater significance
than state borders have in the United States today. Routinely,
these future lawyers will have to draft contracts and other in-
struments which, to measure up to the clients' expectations, will
have to be effective in any forum, regardless of the vagaries of
conflicting choice of law rules. And in a situation in which,
because of basic differences among legal systems, the legal
instrument drawm by the lawyer does not meet this exacting stan-
dard, the clients of the future will at least expect an appro-
priate warning. These clients--whether they be private individuals
or corporations, or public organizations on the local, national,
regional, or international level--thus will need lawyers who will
have outgrown the parochialism of today. Mere ability to comm-
unicate with colleagues in other lands will no longer be enough.
At least in certain fields, the lawyer of the future will have to
be truly familiar with a broad spectrum of legal systems.
For the curriculum builders of the future, this will raise
thorny problems. They will not wish to sacrifice the thoroughness
with which traditionally every law student is introduced into the
intricacies of his own legal system. Thus the time to be devoted
to the new multinational, supranational and international dimen-
sions of law will continue to be limited. It will remain im-
possible, in any event, for all but a few exceptional students to
become sufficiently acquainted with several legal systems as long
as each system must be mastered separately. Thus the law schools
wishing to respond to the new needs will have to solve the prob-
lem by offering courses which, at least in some of the basic sub-
jects, will offer a synoptic view of the guiding precepts per-
meating the various legal systems on a regional or world-wide
scale. The need for such synoptic or synthesizing courses, to be
taught either during or after the period of regular law study, is
increasingly felt even today. Interesting experimental attempts,
some of them stimulated or influenced by the ongoing work of the
Cornell Project,1 have been made already; but to meet the future
needs for a broad-based legal education the effectiveness of which
does not end at the national border, a whole new set of tools will
have to be developed.
These tools, whatever their form, will have to be based on
multilateral comparison and will have to constitute systematic
treatments of entire subjects. Scholarly tools of this kind are
not unprecedented. Eugen Huber, before he was entrusted with the
drafting of the Swiss Civil Code, synthesized the various systems
of private law then in effect on Swiss soil into a single
treatise. Williston and Corbin fused the contract law of 53
jurisdictions into principles and concepts which,'in spite of the
divergencies of detail appearing in the footnotes,'can be si-
multaneously and synoptically grasped by the reader. The task
1To mention but one example, some of the General and National
Reports prepared in the course of the present Study are used as
teaching materials in Professor Gorla's Comparative Law seminar
at the University of Rome.
which Professors Huber, Williston and Corbin performed in the in-
terest of a national legal order, must now be tackled on a multi-
national scale.
One must realize, of course, that the more diverse the legal
systems to be covered, the more difficult it becomes to determine
the concepts and principles in terms of which the material can be
organized. Only the elements common to the various legal systems
under consideration can be used in building the organization and
terminology of the future teaching tools. And before any man, or
group of men, can undertake to perform the function of Eugen Huber
or of Williston on a multinational scale, more knowledge than
is presently available must be gathered on the common core of
conceptual or functional similarities which will furnish the
chapter and section headings of such a work.
What has just been said outlines one of the major purposes
of common core research in general and of this Study in particular.
Because of their limited coverage (if for no other reason), the
volumes presented herewith will not yet fill the demand for a multi-
national Williston or Restatement of Contracts. The authors'
hope is, rather, that with respect to its limited but important
topic this Study will present enough specific information on
areas of agreement and of disagreement among the legal systems
under consideration so that it can serve as a building block
to be used in the construction of the multinational teaching tools
of the future, and that the method developed in this Project will
be found useful in other attempts of a similar nature.
(b) PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL LAW
(aa) Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice points to a further area of legal endeavor in
which the results of common core research may prove useful. In
that provision, which forms an integral part of the Charter of
the United Nations, the signatories recorded their belief that
there are "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations," and directed that these principles shall be "applied"
by the Court in deciding a dispute in accordance with international
law.
The fundamental objective of Art. 38 (1) (c) is plain: In
cases in which a decision cannot be r eached by exclusive reliance
on unambiguous treaty provisions or on accepted rules of customary
international law, the Court is to draw on the--supposedly vast--
reservoir of legal concepts and precepts traditionally utilized in,
and shared by, a number of national legal systems. Of the primary
sources, or bodies of norms, enumerated in Art. 38, this is the
most open-ended. Theoretically, therefore, one might well expect
that international judges, especially when dealing with doubtful
or novel issues, would make ample use of the "general principles"
as prime materials for the building of a systematic body of in-
ternational law. Reality, however, does not conform to this ex-
pectation. Although the Court of International Justice and other
international tribunals often have adorned their opinions with
references to alleged "general principles,"2 there is virtual
unanimity among those learned in public international law that
to date the "general principles" have not, as a practical matter,
been a truly significant factor in the jurisprudence of inter-
national courts.3
The difficulties--some fancied, some real--which account for
this state of affairs, can be divided into three main categories.
(i) The first, and least serious, of these difficulties is
traceable to the fact that courts as well as writers occasionally
have paid lip service to alleged "general principles" which upon
closer analysis turned out to be meaningless generalities. Such
generalities, even though expressed in Latin-phrases-such as suum
cuigue or neminem laedit qui suo jure utitur, are as useless in
international law as they are in a domestic context.4 The hap-
2 See CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTER-
NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, passim (1953).
3 1d., Foreword by Schwarzenberger, at XII; Friedmann, The
Uses of "General Principles" in the Development-of-International
Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 20--1963). For further references
see Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Reco-
nized 4by Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 735 -(19:75
This point is rightly emphasized by Schwarzenberger, Uses
and Abuses of "Abuse of Rights" in International Law, 42 TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY i1 , at 150-52 (1957 published
1958).
hazard references to such meaningless phrases that sometimes can
be found in opinions of international courts and in writings of
publicists, have had only one effect: to bring the "general
principles" into disrepute.
If read correctly, however, Art. 38 (1) (c) does not call for
a mere collection of empty generalities. On the'contrary, it
seeks to bring the results of common core research to bear on
the precise issue, whether broad or narrow, presented to the Court
in a particular case. 5 It follows that when an area of agreement
among a sufficient number of legal systems is found,6 the rele-
vance of such a finding for the purposes of Art. 38 (1) (c) does
not depend on the generality of the language in which it is
expressed. If in the light of common core research it is possible
to formulate the area of agreement in terms of precise and narrow
rules, such formulation, provided it is pertinent to the case at
hand, will be especially helpful to an international tribunal.
It would hardly be a sensible approach for the International
Court of Justice or another international tribunal to disregard
the results of pertinent common core research for the sole reason
that such results are sufficiently specific to be useful. Both
reason and literal meaning (especially of the word "apply")
militate against construing Art. 38 as compelling such an im-
practical approach.7
(ii) A second and more genuine difficulty stems from the cir-
cumstances that some rules of domestic and especially of private
law, even though recognized in a multitude of legal systems, are
by their nature inapplicable to disputes among subjects of Inter-
national Law. Lest one overstate the significance-of this point,
however, some distinctions must be drawn.
5 The arguments in support of this conclusion have been stated
elsewhere. See Schlesinger and Bonassies, Le fonds commun des
syst~mes juridiques--Observations sur un-nouveau projet de re-
cherches, 15 REV. INT. DR. COMP. 501, especially at 516-20 1963).
A similar conclusion was reached by F. A. Mann, Reflections
on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 20 (1957,
published 1959).
6 The question what constitutes a sufficient number of legal
systems, is extensively discussed in the articles cited in the
preceding footnote.
7 See n. 5 supra.
Principles of procedural law usually can be transferred from
the domestic to the international arena with-relative ease. Sub-
stantive norms of international law, on the other'hand; often have
to undergo some transformation when they are invoked-in the setting
of an international dispute; but the additional mental step in-
volved in such transformation-may not-be-of forbidding-difficulty.
8
As to principles of private law relating to contracts, in
particular, it has been said that-they cannot-be-applied-to treaties,
and that, consequently, a statement of-such principles is of no
assistance to an international tribunal dealing with- treaty problems.
As Professor F. A. Mann has shown,9 there are two answers to this
argument. First of all, there'are some principles and:rules of the
law of contracts which, at least-by analogy;'can and probably must
be applied to treaties. As an example, Mann-mentions-the require-
ment, treated in Chapter A-3 of-the present Study; of.a minimal
definiteness of terms.1 0 Secondly, it can be-observed that govern-
ments and international organizations increasingly-tend to enter
into treaties, and into other agreements subject-to-international
law, which by their nature are closely analogous to sales, exchanges,
loans, leases and other transactions-familiar in private.and es-
pecially in commercial law. As Mann points out;'this relatively
8See Ripert, Les r~gles du droit civil applicables-aux rapports
internationaux, 44 ECUEIL DES COURS DE L-ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL (1933 II) 569, at 581-82.
9See n. 5 supra.
1 0This is not the place to list all the instances in which con-
tract analogies are helpful in dealing with treaties. For another
example, in addition to that mentioned in the text,-see Arechaga,
Treat Stipulations in Favor of Third States, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 338
(19563; SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 25-27 (2d ed. 1959). Further
examples are presented in the article (prepared as a contribution
to the Cornell Project) by Seidl-Hohenveldern; General Principles
of Law as Applied by the Conciliation Commission-Established Under
the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 853 (1959).
Concerning vices de-consentement, see the'Draft Articles on the
Law of Treaties adopted by-the-International Law Commission on 18
and 19 July 1966, Arts. 45-49 (UN 18th Gen. Assembly A/CN.4/190,
22 July 1966). These draft provisions, whatever-the-theories of
the draftsmen may have been, in effect draw-on-the notions of mistake,
fraud, and duress as developed in private law. Thus the proposed
provisions--especially on the controversial issue-of duress--are
more in line with the views of Lauterpacht than-with those of the
traditionalists. See also Jenks;Hersch Lauterpacht-The Scholar
as Prophet, 36 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, at 89-90 (1960, publ. 1961).
recent development is bound-to-lead'international tribunals as.
well as the negotiators and draftsmen of international'agreements
and other instruments to rely more heavily-on analogies drawn from
private law.1
0 a -
(iii) The real obstacle to the-utilization of-the resources
referred to in Art. 38 (1) (c) is found in the fact-that-until now
the areas of Tagreement'among legal-systems-have-remained insuff-
iciently elucidated by comparative research. 1 - In the absence of
available comparative studies, it is exceedingly difficult for
counsel to-assemble the necessary data-for the-ad-hoc~purposes of
a particular case pending before-an international tribunal. Occa-
sionally, such attempts have been made; 1 2 but as a rule the parties
are unable to afford the expenses involved, or the effort is be-
lieved not to be warranted by the'significance of-the dispube or
of the particular issue. Thus the tribunal is left to its own
devices if it seeks to ascertain pertinent "general principles."
Under these circumstances, international tribunals can hardly be
blamed if they often construct supposed general-principles "by
combining excellent knowledge of a single domestic legal system
with a strong dose of-fantasy and wishful thinking."1 3
Once comparative research will have established a body of rules
and principles shared-by a multitude of legal systems, inter-
national tribunals will be able to speak more authoritatively and
10aMann, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 50, recognizes-the prac-
tical difficulty of compiling "a treatise or digest which would
describe in a comparative fashion everything that could conceivably
be of interest to the commercial law of nations." But, he adds,
it is feasible and, indeed; imperative to select isolated
subjects and to show how far they have received solutions which
may be described as common to the representative'systems of
law and, therefore, as expressive of a-general principle....
It may well be that the international lawyer will never be
confronted with an actual case upon which'such specific studies
would have a bearing. But if he is conversant-with them, then
he will have a better idea of how he'should proceed when he
is faced with a problem requiring a similar type of investi-
gation.
llsee n. 3 supra. See also Berber, infra n. 13.
1 2See the article by Arechaga, supra n. 10. See also the ref-
erences to extensive comparative materials (submitted by one of the
parties) in the arbitrators' award concerning the dispute between
the government of Saudi Arabia and-the'Arabian'American Oil Co.
(Aramco), 52 REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PR. 272 ff. (1963).
1 3BERBER, 1 LEHRBUCH DES VULKERRECHTS 70 (1960).
more convincingly when they base-their decisions on "general prin-
ciples.1 This may engender a more confident attitude on their part
in tackling novel problems of international law.
There is another, equally important side of the same doin.
From the standpoint of the litigants and of the international
community, judicial use of "general principles" has long been sus-
pect because it has been regarded as a mere mask for capricious
law-making by judicial fiat. But once such principles are es-
tablished, independently of a particular litigation, as pre-existing
norms discovered through disinterested scholarly research, there
will be less reason to fear arbitrary judicial action. Thus it
can be expected that concretization of the norms which pursuant
to Art. 38 (1) (c) may be applicable to the parties' dispute, in
time will encourage a greater degree of reliance on judicial in-
stitutions dispensing international law.
It is not claimed, of course, that common core research is
a panacea which by itself will lead to a full flowering of the rule
of law in international relations. The biggest'and thorniest of
the problems in this area--especially those related to-actual or
threatened aggression, and to the present maldistribution of
wealth and skills--usually cannot be solved-by the mere application
of existing law. We label these problems as political-rather than
legal for the very reason that their peaceful resolution will re-
quire the creation, through patient negotiations, of new agree-
ments, programs and institutions. This point, often emphasized
by leading scholars, has been stated with particular force by
Professor Julius Stone.1 4 It does not follow, however,-as Pro-
fessor Stone seems to imply,1 5 that "an academic-research project
in comparative law" can make no contribution at all to the solu-
tion of the big problems. Without-a basic-store of-shared notions
and principles in the law of transactions and of procedure, it
will be most difficult to negotiate, to draft and-to implement
the instruments that will mark future progress'in international
relations. An endeavor to add to that basic store; and-to enhance
1 4See Stone, A Common Law for Mankind?, 1 INT. STUDIES (Quar-
terly Journal of the Indian School of Int. Studies) 414 (1960).
As its title indicates, the article is a review of THE COMMON LAW
OF MANKIND by C. W. JENKS (1958).
151d. at 440.
the reliability of its components, thus appears to be a necessary
concomitant of such progress.
(bb) International organizations. In addition to Art. 38 (1)
(c), there are many other international instruments--some of them
of much greater present-day practical significance than the Statute
of the International Court at The Hague--which explicitly refer
to the general principles, or a similar multinational body of law,
as the solvent of non-local disputes. 1 5 a Bilateral'treaties pro-
viding for arbitration frequently direct the arbitrators to base
their decisions on principles of law to be-derived from more than
one legal system.
In the last decades, moreover, the practice has grown of in-
serting similar references-into contracts concluded-by interna-
tional'organizations. 1 6 Even in-the absence of-such an express
reference, it would seem-that the innumerable consensual trans-
actions daily concluded by international organizations normally
will not be governed-by'the national law of'a'single nation.1 7
These transactions involve either'(a) matters-relating-to the in-
ternal structure of the organization, such'as the hiring of staff
members,18 or (b) agreements concluded with third parties, not
only-in mere household matters,1 9 but also; more importantly, in
the performance of the functions of-the-organization.2 0 On
occasion--perhaps routinely where household matters'are'involved--
the organization expressly or by clear implication-submits the
15aConcerning the significance of the "general principles" in
European Community law (to mention but one-example), see GRISOLI,
CONTRIBUTO ALLA RICERCA DEI PRINCIPII GENERALI COMUNI Al DIRITTI
DEGLI STATI DELLA COMMUNITA EUROPEA IN MATERIA DI RESPONSABILITA
EXTRACONTRATTUALE (1963); Lorenz, General Principles of Law: Their
Elaboration in the Court of Justice-of the European Communities,
13 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 196l-Y, with further references.
16See JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
152-53 (1962).
1 7 See-Fawcett, The Place of Law in International'Organizations,
36 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 321, 336-ff-.-71-960, publ. 1961).
18See Jenks, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 25 ff, especially 51-55.
19i. repair of the office building; purchase of office
supplies.
20E.g., loans, currency sales, and stand-by agreements; re-
-search contracts; agreements-procuring-materials or services to
aid developing countries.
transaction to local law, or to some other national-law specified
in a choice of law clause.21 But if a legal-question arises in
connection with a contract not subject to-a-particular national
law, and the question is not-clearly'answered by-the text of the
contract or of other applicable-instruments-or-regulations, then
there remains only the resort to-the generalprinciples -of law.
This is so whether or not-the-transaction-in-question-is-thought to
be governed by public international-law; If it-is, then the
applicability of the general principles follows from Art. 38 (1)
(c);2 2 and if it is not, the same result is dictated by the organ-
ization's freedom from local regulation,-and the-unavailability
of any alternative source-of legal rules.
The significance of the "general principles" for-the opera-
tions of international organizations is by-no means limited to
cases of actual or potential litigation. In many-of-their deal-
ings, especially with governments, international organizations
cannot, or will not, resort to judicial or arbitral-processes in
the event of a dispute. More flexible methods;-such'as consul-
tation, negotiation, and mediation, must then be-employed to settle
differences of opinion. Experience has shown-that in-the majority
of cases these methods are successful for the-very-reason that
the participants, recognizing-the necessity of acting within a
framework of legal norms, will not easily disregard a well-
founded appeal to common core principles.
(cc) International trade-and-investment; Principles and
rules derived from more than one legal system-are of ever-
growing importance also in connection with agreements between a
government (usually the government of-a-developing-country) and
21See Jenks, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 133 ff.; Fawcett, loc.
cit. supra n. 17; Kwser, Darlehen der europaischen Investitions-
bank-- Darlehen der Weltbank, 2 EUROPARECHT -- (1967).
2 2Rules of customary international law also are applicable in
such a case; in most instances, however, the subject matter of
transactions concluded by international organizations is such that
the traditional body of the law of nations-does not supply per-
tinent substantive rules. See Friedmann, op; cit. supra n. 3,
at 282. The statement in the text assumes, of course, that the
legal question which has arisen is not answered by the text of
a treaty.
a foreign investor or other-private party. 23 In-negotiating the
terms of such a transaction, the parties-usually-find-it possible
to agree on some form of arbitration; but agreement-on a choice of
law clause is less easily reached. *The private party will rarely
subject itself to the legal system of the sovereign government
with which it contracts, perhaps for the reason thatthe details
of that system are difficult to-ascertain; The'private party may
also fear that by virtue of its sovereignty-the contracting govern-
ment may at a future time proceed unilaterally to change its own
law. The governmental party; on the other hand,-may be unwilling
to see the contract governed by the law of another sovereign.
Practical experience shows that usually this impasse cannot be
overcome except in one of three ways:
(i) by expressly referring to the principles of law shared
by all civilized legal systems, or by the'legal systems of
the parties to the contract;
(ii) by adopting a negative choice of law clause, making it
clear that neither side subjects itself to the national law
of the other; or
(iii) by silence, i.e., by refraining from the insertion of
any choice of law clause.
A clause of type (i) will have to be given effect under the
conflict of laws rules of most countries.2 4 Under such a clause,
the substantive norms to be applied by the arbitrators are de-
localized and can be ascertained only by common core research.
There is recent authority, moreover, for the proposition that the
same result may follow from a negative choice of law clause or
even from the absence of any choice of law clause, if the contract
2 3The literature on this subject is copious. For references,
see Schlesinger and Gndisch, Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsltze als
Sachnormen in Schiedsgerichtsverfahren, 28 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 4
(19b'I); Klein, L'Arbitrage international de droit priv', 20
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR INTERATIONALES RECHT- 41963,
publ. 1964); Lalive, Contracts Between a State of a State Agency
and a Foreign Company, 13 INT L & COMP. L.Q.987-(iO9TTW Lalive,
Un recent arbitrage suisse entre un organism d'tat et use societe
privee Frangare, 19 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 273 (1962, publ. 1963); K'ser, op. cit. supra n. 21.
24 It is necessary, however, to be careful in drafting the
clause and in avoiding certain countries or parts of countries as
the arbitration forum. See-Schlesinger and Gu"ndisch, op. cit.
supra n. 23, especially at 33-44; Klein, op. cit. supra n. 23,
at5, 60; Schmitthoff, Das neue Recht-des-Wel-handels, 28 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT 47, at 73 (1-9-6T).
as a whole evinces-the parties' intention to delocalize or de-
nationalize the transaction. 25
A somewhat different rule applies where the arbitration pro-
ceeding is governed by the recent Convention-on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes,26 which entered into force on-October 14, 1966.
Article 42 of the Convention provides-that-investment'disputes are
to be decided in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed
by the parties, and in the absence of such agreement in accor-
dance with the law of the Contracting State party-to-the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable-. Complete-silence of the
contract concerning the choice of law point thus will not lead to
delocalization, but to the application of the law of the govern-
mental party. It remains to be seen how the draftsmen-of-investment
contracts will react to this new provision. They can, of course,
avoid its application by providing for a form-of-arbitration not
covered by the Convention. Even if they choose to avail them-
selves of the, machinery set up by the- Convention, it would seem
that they can prevent the dominance of the law-of the State party
by a clause of type (i) or (ii). Thus it-is not impossible that in
practice Article 42 will stimulate rather-than-retard-the present
tendency to refer the arbitrators to multinational-principles
of law.
This tendency is not confined to contracts between a govern-
mental and a private party. Even where all'of the-participants in
the transaction are private parties, they may well--and with in-
creasing frequency do--wish to denationalize their contract by a
negative choice of law clause or by an express-reference-to a multi-
national body of law such as the "general principles." In prac-
tice such contract terms ordinarily are, although-perhaps they need
not be, combined with a provision for arbitration.2 7
2 5See the award of the Swiss arbitrator in the case of
Sapphire International Petroleum Limited v. National Iranian
Oil Co., reported and discussed in the two-articles by Lalive,
cited supra n. 23.
For the text of the Convention, see 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
892 ff. (1966). [For a recent discussion of the Convention see
Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention-on Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes, 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1968) -Ed.]
27See Schlesinger and Glindisch, loc;'cit. supra n; 23, where
further references can be found.
In the absence of any choice of law clauseyan issue arising
in connection with a purely private contracttraditionally is re-
garded as governed by the law-of a single country;'to be selected
in accordance with the forum's conflict'of laws-rules. Even this
seemingly trite statement, however, requires considerable qual-
ification in the light of recent developments. *More and more
frequently the parties to international transactions'utilize stan-
dard forms or standard conditions-drafted-by-multinational or-
ganizations and specifically devised for the needs of inter-
national trade. If in addition the parties-have-provided for ar-
bitration in the event of a dispute, the arbitrators-may well in-
fer that according to the intention of the-parties the contract
is to be governed by multinational principles rather'than by any
local law the selection of which would depend-on-the vagaries of
notoriously controversial conflict-of laws rules.2
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This modern trend away from the play-of unpredictable rules
of private international law, and toward-adoption-of-multinational
substantive norms, has received-strong support-in-the recent
Hague Conventions relating to Uniform Laws on-the-international
sale of goods and on the formation of contracts'for'such sales.2 9
These Uniform Laws expressly exclude rules of private-international
law "for the purpose of the application-of the-present Law."3 0
2 8 See Schmitthoff, The Law of International-Trade--Its Growth,
Formulation and Operation, In THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE 3, at 35 (Schmitthoff ed., 1964); Schmitthoff,
International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in 2 CURRENT LAW
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129, at 145-7 (1961), furnishing further ref-
erences.
2 9 See infra, Part II (5) (b) of this Introduction.
3 0 Art. 2 of the Sales Law; Art. 1 subd. 9 of the Formation of
Contracts Law. The draftsmen of these-provisions no'doubt were
influenced by the fact that the pertinent conflicts rules are un-
predictable and highly controversial. For penetrating discussions
see FERID, ZUM ABSCHLUSS VON-AUSLANDSVERTRAGEN -- EINE INTER-
NATIONAL-PRIVATRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG DER VORKONSENSUALEN VER-
TRAGSELEMENTE (1953); Lorenz, Konsensprobleme bei-international-
schuldrechtlichen Distanzvertragen, 159 ARCH. CIV. PR. 193 (1960).
Concerning the Hague Convention of 1955 on the Law Applicable to
International Sales of Goods (ratified by seven European nations),
and the impact of this attempted-unification of conflicts rules
upon the 1964 Conventions which seek to bring about a uniform
substantive law, see Nadelmann, TheUniformLawon the International
Sale of Goods: A Conflict of LawslImbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 14L9-
(17T S; Zweigert and Drobnig,-Einheitliches-Kaufgesetz und inter-
Gaps in the Uniform Laws are to be filled, not by reference to any
local law, but "in conformity with the general principles.on which
the present Law is based."3 1 These general principles can be
found only by comparative research.3 2 As the provisions.of the
Uniform Formation of Contracts Law are rather terse, the courts of
the countries adopting the Law will frequently have to fall back
on "general principles" to be ascertained in this manner. It is
hoped that the present Study may prove helpful in such cases.
(c) PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Even for the solution of purely domestic problems, an exam-
ination of the common core of legal systems may be of importance.
Written and unwritten rules in force in many countries expressly
refer to the general principles of law as a primary or subsidiary
source of law.3 3 A reference of this kind can be of particular signif.
nationales Privatrecht, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 146 (1965). It
should be noted that the 1955 Convention in its Art. 2 (3) con-
tains an express (though not very satisfactory) provision on choice
of law problems arising in cases where the very formation of a
sales contract is in dispute.
3 1Sales Law, Art. 17. The Formation of Contracts Law does
not contain such a provision; but being in-pari materia with the
Sales Law, it must be construed as implying the same principle.
See von Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz ilber-die-Vereinheitlichung
des Kaufrechts vom 2.bis 25. April 196 -- Die Ergebnisse der
Konferenz hinsichtlih: derVereinheitlichung- des--Rechts des Ab-
schlusses von Kaufvertr-Agen, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 101, atl-l-12
(1965).
32Von Caemmerer, loc. cit. supra n.31, points out that the
relevant general principles can be derived only "from the Law
itself and from its foundations in comparative law."
33Many code provisions to this effect (but differing from each
other in their wording), are cited by CHENG, op.-cit. supra n. 2,
at 400-08. See also SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 158-59, 195,
317-18 (2d ed. 1959).
In the 19th Century, such code provisions often were inter-
preted as referring exclusively to general principles underlying the
national legal order. Today, however, there-is a growing tendency
to take a broader view and to construe provisions of this kind as
authorizing the court, in doubtful cases, to seek guidance by
studying the pertinent solutions to be found-in other legal
systems. SeeSghlesinger, The Nature of General Principles of Law,
in RAPPORTS GENERAUX AU VIE -C-NGRTS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT CON-
PARE 235, at 263 (pub. 1964 by Centre Interuniversitaire de Droit
Compare under the direction of Professor Limpens).
icance in a new country faced with the task of creating its own
system of law. The judges and legislators of such a-country may
be disinclined to follow the model of a single-older nation; but
they will always try to inform themselves of the-multinational
common core of civilized'law--provided materials for-the study of
this common core are available.
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(2) Choice-of Subject
It was in the light of the manifold purposes listed above
that the subject of the first pioneer effort of-common core re-
search had to be selected. This-was no easy task; and before a
final choice was made by those in charge'of-the'Cornell Project,
the expert advice of outside-consultants was sought. 1 Almost
unanimously, they agreed that the first research effort of this
kind should be devoted to a portion of the law'of-consensual
obligations. In support of this view, they-pointed-to the uni-
versality, in the modern world, both of the notion-of contract
and of its every-day practical use in international-as well as
34See Lev, The Lady and the Banyan Tree:. Civilz-Law Change in
Indonesia, 14 AM. J. COP. L. 2_, 303-04 (19657T
1For the purpose of discussing the scope-and method of the
projected research undertaking, a three-day conference was held at
the Cornell Law School in September 1957.- The-conference was
attended by legal scholars representing a wide-range'of fields as
well as countries. In addition'to members of-the-Cornell law
faculty, the participants (listed with-their affiliations as of
that time) included Dr. Vera Bolgoar, Executive Secretary of the
American Journal of Comparative Law;-ProfessorF.,de*Sola Canizares,
Dean of the International-Faculty-of Comparative-Law; Luxembourg,
and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, Barcelona,
Spain; Dr. Chandra P. Gupta;-University of Delhi Law School, India;
Dr. Kurt Lipstein, Cambridge University,.England; Professor Hans
Rupp, University of TUbingen-(and a member-of-the-Federal Con-
stitutional Court), Germany; Professor-Giuseppe-Treves, University
of Trieste, Italy; Dr. Uri Yadin, Deputy Attorney-General,.Israel.
The conference dealt with a wide-range of-questions, such as
choice of subject; number and selection-of-legal-systems to be
represented; number and qualifications-of-participants-in the pro-
jected seminar sessions; preparation,-duration-and operation of
these sessions. The views expressed,-although-not-always unani-
mous, were most helpful; but the responsibility-for the decisions
ultimately made must, of course,-be'borne exclusively by the
Cornell Project, and especially-by the author-of this Introduc-
tion.
domestic transactions.2
Within the area of contract law, every topic-is important,
and any choice among such topics will have-its-critics as well as
its supporters. The selection-of Formation of'Contracts as the
first subject of study by the-Cornell-Project-was-prompted by a
number of considerationsv In launching a project-of such novelty
and difficulty, it seemed-wise to start-with a topic to-which the
system-builders everywhere-almost-unanimously'have-assigned an ini-
tiatory, separate, and well-defined place: Another;,and perhaps
more decisive, factor in the selection was the-great practical
importance of the subject, highlighted-inter aliaby'the strenuous
(and still continuing) attempts which have been made during the
last three decades to unify the pertinent-rules-insofar as they
relate to international sales of goods.
In other areas of-the law of consensual obligations, problems
arising from the diversity of national laws-very often can be
avoided or neutralized by formulated customs, standard contracts
and other forms of international-commercial practice; But these
devices normally operate by furnishing certain contract terms; and
such terms can become effective only after a contract has been
concluded. When the very formation of the contract-is at issue,
one faces "the intrinsic'difficulty of solving-problems of making
a contract in the contract itself'."3
It might be argued that some of the legal problems involved
in the formation of a contract can be avoided-by-certain stip-
ulations in the offer, and that international-traders thus can
neutralize the pertinent rules of-diverse national-laws by inserting
standardized stipulations of this kind into'their-offers. The
2 Perhaps it is not even necessary to limit-the statement in
the text exclusively to the modern world; it may-apply to any
society in which small economic units based-on family, tribe or
feudal coherence are no longer self-sufficient. Cf. 4 BEAUCHET,
HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE DE LA REPUBLIQUE ATH NIENNE 3 (1897).
3Honnold, The Influence'of the Law of-International Trade
on the Development and Characterof-English-and-American Commer-
cial Law, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70,
at77 T7-chmtthoff, ed., 1964). On the basis of practical ex-
perience gathered at the Institut flir Rechtsvergleichung of the
University of Munich, the same point was emphasized by FERID, ZUM
ABSCHLUSS VON AUSLANDSVERTRAGEN--- EINE INTERNATIONAL-PRIVATRECHT-
LICHE UNTERSUCHUNG DER VORKONSENSUALEN VERTRAGSELEMENTE 5-8 (1953).
present Study, it is true- shows that in all'legal'systems under
consideration many of the rules of-law-pertaining-to offer and
acceptance are in the category-of-ius'dispositivum--i.e., that
they yield to a clearly expressed intention-of-the offeror. It
would be erroneous, however, to conclude that-this greatly detracts
from the practical importance of-the pertinent-rules of law as
a subject of comparative study. This for-several reasons: First,
the offeror's power to control'the'negotiations-by~a-stipulation
in the offer is always derived-from applicable'law;,only those
stipulations can be confidently used in international trade which
are shown by comparative research to-be-effective'in'all legal
systems. Secondly, it is clear that there'are-certain rules re-
lating to the formation of contracts~which'at'least-in:some legal
systems are resistant to any stipulation-in-the-offer;'e.g., the
common law rule making certain offers-revocable-in spite.of an
express stipulation of irrevocability. 4 Thirdly,,and most im-
portantly, we are taught by experience that'while standardized
contract clauses are increasingly recommended-by-international
organizations, and used by international-traders,'to'solve problems
of performance and remedies,:the same-organizations-seem to be
more reluctant to propose standard-stipulations-which-by incor-
poration into the offer would change the'regular-play of'the rules
relating to offer and acceptance;5 This is true-even in those
branches of business in which standardized-contract-forms are
widely used for purposes-of international trade.
6
4See the General Report and the pertinent-Individual Reports
on A-10, infra; Farnsworth;-Formationof'International-Sales Con-
tracts: Three Attempts at-nificationy'll0 U;-PA;'L.'REV. 305,
at 315-17, 3 (1962).
5One reason for this may lie in the-difficulty-of drafting
clauses for standard offers that would-fit'a multitude of bar-
gaining situations. E.g., problems-of variance-between offer and
acceptance theoretically could be solved-by-a-standard-stipulation
in the offer, strictly prescribing-a specified-wording for the
acceptance. Such a stipulation;-if-unambiguous;-would be given
effect in all legal systems considered-in-this'Study-(see infra,
General Report on B-2, n. 2); but-as-a practical-matter it is
clear that in many situations a clause-of-this-kind would not
serve the parties well, and that even-the'offeror'often might
find its use not to be in his interest.
6See Honnold, A Comparisonof'National'and-Regional Unifi-
cations of the Law of Salesand-Avenues'Toward-Their-Harmonization:
Prospects and Problems, in UNIFICATION OF'THELAW GOVERNING IN
TERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 3, 7 (Honnold, ed.'1966); see also-the
round-table discussion, id. at 366--72, and-Farnsworth, lc. cit.
It must be remembered, also, that questions of law relating
to the formation of a contract cannot always be-resolved or avoided
by the device of arbitration; When the-parties-foresee-the possi-
bility of any kind of dispute in connection-with-an unquestionably
concluded contract, they can relegate'the otherwise applicable
rules of substantive law (even the mandatory ones)-to relative
insignificance by providing-for'arbitration-and-by anchoring the
arbitration proceedings in a-legal-system-which does-not hold the
arbitrators to strict observance of a-particular'set of sub-
stantive rules.7 But when-the-formation-of-the-contract is ques-
tioned, in that event the-arbitration device may-lose-much of its
effectiveness; unless the agreement to arbitrate-is-contained in
a Rahmenvertrag or other-independent-contract;-it-is-likely that
any doubt raised as to the formation-of the main-contract will
extend to the very existence-of-the'arbitration-agreement, thus
affecting the power of the-arbitrators-to-resolve-the dispute,
and corroding the practical-value of any'award they-might render
against a defaulting defendant.
It follows that in the'area-of'formation-of contracts the
legal rules embodied in diverse'legal-systems are-much-less likely
to be displaced by the parties' autonomous-arrangements than in
other areas of contract law. -Thus, it is submitted;-the prac-
tical significance of those rulesandthe need-for-their compara-
tive study are particularly-great in this area.
This will remain true-even-in-the event-of-widespread adop-
tion of the Hague Conventions relating to Uniform-Laws on the
international sale of goods and-on-the-formation-of-contracts
for such sales. Many types of contracts-are-not-covered by these
Laws. Where it applies,-the'Uniform'Formation-of Contracts Law
lays down only a relatively small number of rules;'-The-remaining
gaps, as has been pointed out'above;are intended-tobe filled
by resort to general principles to-be found-by'comparative re-
search. Thus, within as well as without-the domain-of-the Uniform
Law, it would seem thatan'assured knowledge'of'the-extent and
the limits of the common core of-legal systems-is needed by those
who have to counsel-international traders-onproblems involving
the formation of contracts.
7Cf. Schlesinger and Gundisch;'Allgemeine-Rechtsgrundsatze
als Sachnormen in Schiedsgerlchtsverfahren, 28 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
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(3) Choice of-LegalSystems-and-Participants
(a) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
One of the crucial decisions-that-had-to-be-faced-by the'Cor-
nell Project, as-by any-other research-undertaking-in the field
of comparative law, was the choice of-the-legal-systems to be
considered. The theories which guided the-actual selections were
expounded in an article published-elsewhere:8 -For-the sake of
avoiding repetition, reference is made to-that'article. What is
said there, will without further amplification make clear the
reasons for most of the selections and omissions reflected in this
Study. The remarks which follow'will'be'limited;-therefore, to a
few instances in which the treatment of a-given-legal system or
group of systems calls for additional-explanation.
A word should be said; perhaps; about the reasons for the
selection of the South African system: It'was felt that as one
of the few uncodified civil law'systems still in existence, and
also as an essentially-civilian system that has-absorbed powerful
common law influences, the private-law'of'South'Africa'might be of
particular interest to thecomparativist. This-system-of private
law, and especially of contract-law,-has not been-affected by the
controversial apartheid measures- which'the-present-rulers of South
Africa have seen fit to adopt.-In addition,-the'fact'that one
of the authors of the reports-on English and Commonwealth law,
although not a South African lawyer,hadthenecessary'civil law
background to cover South-Africa along-with-a-number of-common law
countries, supplied a practical inducement.
Some comment is called for, also, to explain-the non-con-
sideration of the legal systems'of-Spanish-and-Portuguese tongue.
In this regard, the Project-was'struck by-events-beyond'the planners'
control. A noted legal scholar, intimately-familiar both with
Spanish law and with the legal-systems of'severalLatin American
countries, had been invited to'participate in'the-Project, and had
8See Schlesinger,-The Common-Core of-Legal"Systems--An
Emerging Subject of Comparative-Study, in-the-volume TWENTIETH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW---LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
HESSEL E. YNTEMA, at 65, especially 66-72 (1961).
accepted the invitation. Shortly before the beginning-of the first
session, at a time when it-was too'lateto-replace-him;-he had to
cancel his previous commitment-for-medical-and-family reasons. In
this instance, the theoreticalcriteria-recited~in-the above-men-
tioned article were overcome-by human-and-accidental-factors.9
In less drastic fashion; such-factors-alsoaffected-the-extent
to which it was possible'to-coverlIslamic-law-and-Egyptian law.
One of the decisions made-rather-early-in the-process-of planning
the Cornell Project was to-include-several-legal-systems of de-
veloping countries. It maybe true that-in-the-area-of contract
law a comparison of the world's legal systems-largely comes down to
what the late Professor Ascarelli used-to call-a-dialogue be-
tween common law and civil-law., Evena plant~of-European origin,
however, sometimes may*absorb'different-nutrients-and-may display
new variations if it is grown-in-nonEuropean soil:, For this
reason it appeared desirable-to include at-least-one-common-law-
influenced and one civil-law-influenced systemof-a-developing
country among the legal systems to be-thoroughly-considered. The
choice fell on India, which inuturn-has-influenced-other legal
systems in Asia and'Africa;-and on-Egypt; which-by-its-Civil Code
of 1949 has set a standard for a-number-of-Arab-nations. In
addition, it was planned to consider Islamiclaw-because of its
general importance as a legal system-and-its-continuing-influence
in some parts of the Middle East and of North and'East-Africa (even
though it was recognized that insofaras'contract-law'is-concerned,
such influence is no longer'a strong one except'in-a-very small
number of countries). An Egyptian scholar, familiar'with Islamic
and with modern Egyptian-law, participated in-all-of-the sessions
of the Cornell Project except the last;.-and prepared-individual
9It is hoped, however, that in thefuture-the'results reached
in this Study will be checked-againstthe-law-inforce in some of
the countries of the Iberian peninsula and-of-Latin America. See
infra, text at nn. 34-35. This'processof-checking-should'not prove
too difficult, especiallyinview'of the fact that-the seminal
code systems of the civil law world, which have exercised consid-
erable influence in Spain and Latin America, have-been-considered
in the present Study.
reports on both systems. These reports are available in the
Cornell law library.1 0 To a large extent; it-was'possible to
consider these individual-reports-in preparing the-General Re-
ports. Not infrequently, this-is indicated'by-footnote ref-
erences in the latter reports.--But the-individual-reports on
Egyptian and Islamic law are not-included-in-the-present publi-
cation, because the reporter; due-to his-appointment-to high
government office in his-own country,-was unable-to-participate
in the final processof'revisionI of-all of'the-individual re-
ports.
(b) SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS
A special and difficult-problem had-tobe:faced-with respect
to the socialist legal systems; -Scholars-from-socialist coun-
tries have tended, at least in-the past;-to-deny-the-comparability
of socialist and "bourgeois" solutions-in-most-fields-of law, in-
clusing that of contracts. 1 2- Western-scholars;-though not sub-
scribing to the ideological premises underlying-this-view of their
socialist colleagues, have to admit-that'there-is-a-question of
comparability which requires-serious-examination.1 3
-To conduct
such an examination a limine, and-to-make a final decision as to
the inclusion or exclusion-of-the socialist-legal-systems.at the
threshold of the work undertaken-by-the-Cornell-Project, would
have been a rash and dangerous procedure,-especially-in view of
the rapid changes in pertinent rules:and practices-that were in
progress in socialist countries-at-that-time; 
-it was decided,
therefore, to study the "contract" law of.several socialist
1 0See Acknowledgments, infra 
- On the-general-nature and the
sources of Islamic law, and-the position of contract law within
the system, see also Abdel-Wahab;-Meaning:and Structure-of Law in
Islam, 16 VANDERBILT L. REV. 115 (1962);:Habachy PropertyRght
and ontract-in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 450,'58 ff. (1962).
1 1 See infra, Part II (4) (b) of this Introduction.
1 2 The views of socialist scholars are discussed by Hazard,
Socialist Law and The International-Encyclopedia;-79-HARV. L. REV.
278 (1965.) and by Loeber,Rechtsvergleichung-zwischen-Landern mit
verschiedener Wirtschaftsordnung; 26-RABELS'ZEITSCHRIFT 201
(1961). See also Knapp, loe; cit; infra n. 20.
1 31n addition to the articles cited in-the-preceding foot-
noteA which contain further-references, see-DAVID'and GRASMANN,
EINFUHRUNG IN DIE GROSSEN RECHTSSYSTEME DER GEGENWART 270-77
(1966); Schlesinger, op. cit. supran;8; at 68-70.
nations for the very purpose-of determining-comparability. In
other words, the question of-comparability'was-to-be-determined
after, and not before, an-attempt-to compare.
Of the socialist systemsPolish law was-more-fully:considered
than the law of the other countries-of-eastern-and-southeastern
Europe treated in the "Communist'Legal-Systems-Anntations.
1 4
In addition, considerable work was done-on-the-East'German "Ver-
tragssystem," a statutory scheme-whichdisplays-exceptional thor-
oughness in regulating-the-contracts-between-"enterprises belong-
ing to the People." Memoranda-written-on-this-subject by Dr.
Ulrich Drobnig and by Professor-Werner-Lorenz-are-on-file in the
Cornell law library; although still-of considerable-interest, they
are not included in the-present-publication-because-in-matters of
detail they have been rendered obsolete by-recent legislation.
1 5
In addition to the Projectparticipants'°own-research--which,
being substantially liimited-to the subject-of-formation of con-
tracts, perhaps was too limited in-scope to-serve-as-the-sole basis
for resolving the issue-of-comparability~-:-otherresources were
used. Much benefit was derived-from the-growing-literature on the
subject,1 6 from consultation-with-experts-in-the-United-States,17
and from manifold personal contacts-with socialist scholars. 1 8
1 4On the difference dravm in-this-Study-between-"Reports"
and'Annotations" see infra.
1 5New East German VERTRAGSGESETZ-of Feb 25;°1965,,eff. May 1,
1965 (G.Bl. 1965 I 107).
16For references see the articles byHazard-and-Loeber, cited
supra n. 12. See also Drobnig;-Das-"Privatrecht"uder Staats-
wirtschaft-inder Ostzone, 152 ARCH;-CIV;-PR:'542(l-953-; Pleyer,
Vertrag und Wirtschaftsordnung, 1963 JZ233.
Most of the literature is limited-to-a-discussion of one or
more of the socialist-systems-in Europe;-On-the points~relevent to
the present Study, however; the position-(in'the-early 1960's) does
not seem to have been radically different-in Communist-China. See
Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts-in-the-Chinese People's
Republic,--HARV. INT'L L. CLUB J.-- ff,27-2F;" h5-47 (1962);
Hsiao, The Role of Economic Contracts-in-Communist-China, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 10297(l93 ). -But'see-Cohen,-hnese*Medat oniion the Eve
of Modernization, 54 CALIF.-L; REV; -l20O;-at-203-04"('I--66, where
attention is called to certain-procedural-differences.
17A memorandum surveying-the-law-of formation-of'"contracts"
in socialist countries was-prepared-for the:Project-by-Dr; Kazimierz
Grzybowski and Dr. George Torzsay-Biber.
18The author of this Introductionattended'theJuly'f961 round-
table discussion (at Trier, Germany), sponsored-by the International
In all of the socialist'systems-there are provisions, or-
dinarily found in the civil-code-°which deal-with-contracts-among
individual citizens.o These-or-similar-provisions'usually are
applicable,also, to transactions-between-an individual citizen,
on the one hand, and a socialist enterprise-on-the-other. In
many respects, and certainly- as-to-the formation-of-contracts,
these code provisions are not-only-comparable but-remarkably
similar to those found in'the-codes-of western civil law countries.
The problem of comparability-of socialist-and-so-called
capitalist contract law-becomes-more-difficult, however, if with
regard to the socialist legal systems one'takes-into-consideration
not only the contracts of the type just-mentioned, but also the
economically more important-planz-fulfilling "cobtracts-among
socialist enterprises. For-purposes-of-discussion;-the argument
against comparability may be stated-in-the followingover-sim-
plified form: (i) In a socialist economy, contracts-governed by
the civil code or by'similar provisions-of:prvate-law are of
practical importance only within-a-strictly limited sphere of
economic activities. (ii), The important-transactions are those
concluded among socialist-enterprises-in-fulfillment-of a Plan,
and such transactions are-not-comparable-to-private-contracts of
the traditional type. Hence-it follows (iii),that-what is com-
parable in this area-is relatively-unimportant,-and*what is
important is not comparable.1 9
Closer examination shows, however, that-this-argument is
based on unwarranted generalizations;- In the-first-place, the
various "socialist" systems differ from:each-other-in their
Association of Legal Science and-chaired by-ProfessorJosef Esser,
which dealt with the questionof-comparability-of-legal-institutions,
especially in the fields-of-property-and-contract;-as between
countries having radically different economic~structures. See 10
AM. J. COMP. L. 508 (1961); Professor-W; J;'Wagner-participated in
the Colloquium on'National andRegional:Unifications of the Law of
Sales, also arranged-by the-International-Association of Legal
Science, which was heldin-New'York in September1964"(see Honnold,
op. cit. supra n. 6). All of the-participants-in-the Cornell
Project, moreover, had an opportunity-in the-course-of one of the
Ithaca sessions for an informal exchange-of views and information
with Professor Adam Szpunar, Rector-of-the Universityiof Lodz.
1 9 For a more elaborate statement of~thequestion(without an
attempt to answer it), see Schlesinger;-opy-cit.-supra n. 8, at
68-70.
treatment of Pontracts between socialist-enterprises.2 0 As
to the Yugoslav system, for instance;-it may'well be doubted
whether anybody today would still put forward-the-argument.outlined
above. Even with respect to-the countries-which-adhere'to a more
conservative reading of socialistdoctrine;-it-appears that
neither part (i) nor part-(ii) of-the-argument-can-be-maintained
without serious qualifications throwing-doubt-on-the'soundness of
the conclusion.
(i) The scope left for contracts-between-privatecitizens
depends, in each country;'on the permitted-(and-not-always negli-
gible) extent of the private sector;-'More-importantly; even though
a state enterprise or a cooperative may-be-one-of-the-parties to
the contract, many transactions occurring-in-the-distribution of
goods and services are basically'governed-by-provisions of the
civil code and enforced by-ordinary'civilcourts. -This is gen-
erally true on the retail level; 2 1 and-in-somesocialist.coun-
tries, where agriculture has-not-been-collectivized- even with
respect to the wholesale-distribution-of:a-large-portion of ag-
ricultural products.
Moreover, all foreign trade'transactions-of-socialist enter-
prises, whether concluded with-similarenterprises'in-other social-
ist nations or with private-trading'partners-in-free-enterprise
countries, are subject to-legal-rules deliberately-patterned after
traditional western models;2 2 Thisis-so-even-inoCze'hoslovakia,2 3
20See Some Comments on the-PolishLegal-System,-infra p. 316,
and Some Comments on the Legal Systems-of-Communist-Countries,
infra pp. 214 ff. See also*Hazard .The-Soviet-Pattern-Spreads'Abroad,
196' u. ILL. L.F. 277, especially at 292.
The arguments-against-comparability-can-be;,and-have been,
put most strongly from the'standpoint of the-legal system-of Czech-
oslovakia. See Knapp,-Vertrage-im-tschechoslowakischen-Recht, 27
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 495 (1963). In-that-country;-the-traditional
system of the law of-obligations-has-been-somewhat-modified even
in the area governed by the'civil-code-(i.e-.; the-new'CIVIL CODE of
1964). See Knapp, Das neue-tschechoslowakische7Zivilgesetzbuch,
6 ZFRV 19 (1965).
21See Zile, Law and the-Distribution-of-Consumer-Goods in the
Soviet Union, 196W1U. -LL. L.F. 212.
2 2See Trammer, The Law ofForeign'Trade-in-the-Legal Systems
of the Countries of Planned Economy;-in'THE-SOURCES OF THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, at 4l ff. (Schmitthoff,-ed., 1964).
23See Kalensky, Die Grundzuge- des: tschechoslowakischen Gesetzes
uber den internationalen Handel; 30RABELSZEITSCHRIFT 296 (see
especially at 301 and, with respect to formation-of contracts, at
308, 313-15) (1966).
a country which in regard to'domestic'transaction'has'attempted
largely to exclude the ordinary principles-of'private-contract
law from the field of "contracts"-between-planned-economy units,
and to subject "contracts" ofthe-latter-type'to-a'separate and
independent regulatory scheme.2
4
It is thus clear that in-most socialist:legal-systems the
rules of traditional contract-law-'whether embodied-in the civil
code or in other enactments, are-unquestionably-operative in im-
portant segments of the economy; and for this'reason alone cannot
be disregarded as being devoid'of practical-significance.
(ii) Turning to transactions'between-planned'economy units,
one is struck, first of all;-by'the-fact'that-scholars in the
socialist world are not-in-agreement-concerning-the-nature of these
"contracts." Their-nature,-indeed,-has-been'the-subject of a
famous controversy among socialist'experts; -The'central'issue in
that controversy has been whether'such-transactions are truly
contracts, and whether--to the'extent-compatible-with'pertinent
special regulations and with the-applicable-Plan-they are to be
governed by the relevant'provisions of the-civil'code; In the
Soviet Union the question was'regarded:as so basic-that-the answer
came, under rather dramatic'circumstances;:in-the'form of a
decision rendered on the highest political level;2 5 The de-
cision was to the effect that planfulfilling'transactions be-
tween socialist enterprises are-true contracts:in-the'traditional
legal sense, and subject-to-the-provisions:of-the-civil'code. In
the great majority, though-not-in-all, of the-other'socialist
legal systems the controversy was-resolved-in the'same sense.
The-fact remains, nevertheless;'that contracts-between planned
economy units are essentiallyinstruments-for-fulfilling a Plan.
This is bound to affect,,inter-alia the'process of formation of
such contracts. The Plan ordinarily-spells:out-many-of theterms
of the individual contracts-to-be concludedinthe'course of its
implementation, and often the'Plan-imposes.upon:the-parties'a'duty
2 4 See Knapp, loc. cit. supra n. 20. This is now a minority
position within the socialist camp."-See-infra;'text following n.
25. 2 5 See Hazard, Has the SovietState'a:NevrFunction?, 34
POLITICAL QUARTERLY-391, at 394--96-(963T.
to contract. To the extent that such-Kontrahierungszwang25 a exists,
it is clear that the traditional-rules of offer and-acceptance,
many of which protect the. parties' freedom in'devising-negotiating
moves, must in part become-inapplicableo" Some-of the-usual rules
(e.g., that in general silence is'not-acceptance;or-that a qual-
ified acceptance normally does not-bring-about-a contract) in-
deed are invariably altered or displaced by special'provisions in-
sofar as there is Kontrahierungszwang; and the-parties' consensus
may be rendered unnecessary in-such a case-by'an-Arbitrazh de-
cision issued in a "pre-contract dispute" proceeding.
2 6
Thus, insofar as the process of its formation'is concerned,
a transaction concluded as the result-of-Kontrahierungszwang is
hardly comparable to a contract freely-entered-into by the par-
ties, even though some of-the applicable-rules-(e;g:, with respect
to counter-offers, Gen. Rept. on B-5, n. 12)-remain similar.to the
traditional ones. It may be true that-in non-socialist systems,
also, there are instances-ofKontrahierungswang, and-that in the
recent past these instances have been growing in-number and im-
portance.2 7 It might be arguable, therefore; that with respect
to the use of Kontrahierungszwahg the difference-between socialist
and non-socialist systems is one of degree-only;--The-difference,
nevertheless, remains an important-one, affecting'not:only busi-
ness practices but also, at least indirectly; the daily lives of
millions of consumers.
On the other hand, it must-be remembered that-even under a
socialist system not all Plans are-alike;, To a:rapidly increasing
extent, planned economy units in most of the-socialist countries
are left free by the applicable Plan, and-indeed-are-encouraged,
to display initiative and to enter into contracts-unaffected by
2 5 aFor the sake of brevity, this well-knownGerman term
(meaning compulsion to contract) will be'used-in'the discussion
which follows.
26 See Loeber, Plan and'Contract-Performance-in-Soviet Law,
1964 U. ILL. L.F. 12--8, l-l-Tff.; Pleyer, loc.cit:-supra n. lb.
27 See Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo; Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of-Contract, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 69-12
T1-9-4 -T-unc- La possibiit decomparer-.le"contrat"dans des
systemes juridigues d structur-s-iconomiques-iff~rentes, 27
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 478, 487-68 (1962).
Kontrahierungszwang.28 The'formationof such-free-contracts is
subject to the traditional rules;'usually embodied-in the civil
code. On particular points. there may-be'special rules for con-
tracts (even free contracts) between'socialist-enterprised; but
this is no more remarkable'than-the-occasional'existence, in
non-socialist legal systems;-of-special provisions-by-which some
of the ordinary rules governing "civil" contracts are modified
with reference to commercial transactions.
Thus it can be said that-in'relation to-the-vast and grow-
ing body of transactions that are free-from-Kontrahierungszwang,
the planned economy units of socialist countries-conclude their
contracts under-rules which are similar-to; and-often identical
with, the traditional rules-of offer and-acceptance.
It has been argued that-this'similarity-exists-only on the
technical level, and that from a functional-point of view a
contract between two socialist enterprises;-both-working toward
a common goal defined by the public-interest and-concretized in
the Plan, cannot be compared-with an arms-rlength-transaction of
two private parties each of whom-pursues his own'selfish interest
by seeking maximum individual profit.- Closer-analysis, however,
shows that this argument, whatever its theoretical-merits, is not
borne out by the facts of business life;- In the modern world,
socialist as well as non-socialist, business:transactions usu-
ally are negotiated and concluded-by the managers-rather than
the owners of the contracting corporations.--The principal motive
of the manager, socialist of non-socialist, is tomaximize the
success of his enterprise--a-success:which'insocialist as well
as non-socialist systems is largely-measured-by'an-annual accoun-
ting (whether such accounting-be in-terms of-Planfulfillment or
of profit and loss). True, the-managers'in socialist countries
are incessantly admonishedto refrain from "enterprise egotism"
2 8See Some Commentson the Polish Legal-System, infra p. 315
& n. 9, and Some Comments on the Legal Systems of Communist Coun-
tries, infra pp. 216, 222;Loeber, loc:cit. supra-n; 26. Pre-
dictions for the future are-hazardous; but at-present (April 1967)
the trend mentioned in the text is strong; *If it continues,
future Plans in most of the countries in question may make only
limited, and perhaps exceptional; use-of-Kontrahierungszwang.
and to put the public good before the success-of their enter-
prise.2 9 But the very fact that these constant admonitions are
necessary, seems to prove that such appeals-to the managers'
public spirit have only an intermittent-effect=.-an effect easily
matched by capitalist managerst -growing awareness of public du-
ties and public opinion.
Even in socialist theory, moreover, it is recognized that
material incentives are crucial, and-that a-planned economy
unit, therefore, operates not only in the'public'interest, but
also in its own self-interest. The unit's accomplishment during
a given fiscal period, strongly affected-by-contracts concluded
with other socialist enterprises and determined-by-an intricate
system of accounting, has a distinct influence-upon-the income
and the fringe benefits of the workers as well-as-the managers.
3 0
The basic configuration of interests-and desires,-in response to
which the classical rules of offer and acceptance-have been
developed, thus is not radically different when"-in the absence
of Kontrahierungszwang--two socialist-enterprises deal with each
other. 3 1 From a functional as well as a technical-point of view
2 9See, e.g., Pleyer, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 234.
30See Marton, Versuch eines'einheitlichen-Systems der zivil-
rechtlichen Haftung, 162 ARCH. CIV.-PR. 1 ff., at74-75-96
Pleyer, loc. cit. supra n. 16. Cf. Bolglr; The Public Interest,
12 J. PUB. L. 13, at 50-52 (1963). Concerning-recent-developments,
see Dorsey, Post-Stalin-SovietJurisprudencey'l THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER 378, at 390 (19-77.
31Occasionally it has been'argued that-because-of the strong
admixture of public law elements the-contracts-between'socialist
enterprises should be compared to government-contracts rather than
ordinary private contracts. The argument, however; is not con-
vincing. It overlooks that when two planned-economy units contract
with each other, they do so on a basis of complete-equality, each
party representing the-same amalgam of public-and selfish inter-
ests. Such a contract is hardly comparable to a transaction be-
tween two parties so inherently different from-each other as the
government and a private firm in a capitalist-country. A some-
what closer analogy might be presented-by-the'contracts between
two government agencies or two public corporations-which occasion-
ally occur even in non-socialist systems'(e.gy-:the so-called
Project Orders and Economy Act Orders-in the'United States, see
NAVY CONTRACT LAW §§4.24 and 4.25 (2d ed. 1959)). But these are
too exceptional to be used as a functionalcounterpart of con-
tracts between planned economy units. In-most important respects,
moreover, such intra-governmental deals are apt-to-be governed
by ordinary contract law (ibid.)
it would seem justifiableytherefore,'to-suggest that the rele-
vant rules found in the-contract-law-of socialist-countries are
comparable to their western-counterparts-even-insofar as they
apply to (non-compulsory) contracts between socialist enter-
prises.32
(c) SYSTEMS NOT FULLY COVERED
The number of legal systems fully covered in the present
Study is not inconsiderable; but, of course, it is limited. The
question thus arises whether and to what extent the results reached
can be said to have a measure of validity with-reference to sys-
tems not fully covered. The answer, stated-more-extensively
elsewhere,3 3 is predicated on the-fact-that so-far as the law of
contracts is concerned, almost every legal system-in the world is
more or less closely related to one or-several-of the systems
fully covered in this Study. Thus, while no claim-is made that
the findings embodied in the General'Reports are wholly.accurate
with respect to any legal system other than'those-fully covered,
it is reasonable to ascribe to these findings-(and'to the support-
ing data in the relevant individual report or-reports)-the quality
of informed conjectures or at least of working hypotheses in
regard to such other systems.
Such conjectures or hypotheses can ripen-into reliable
knowledge only when they have been re-checkedagainst'the law of
a particular country. In the course-of the Cornell-Project, an
attempt has been made to gain-some experience-regarding this
process of rechecking. As is-more fully explained below,34 the
Italian, Polish and Australian-Canadian-New Zealand-"Annotations"
on some of the General Reports in-Chapter A'(Offer),are the product
of such subsequent re-checking. In addition, after the work on
3 2For further discussion of the extent to-which socialist
legal systems have been considered in this Study; and of'the prob-
lems of comparability encountered in this-connection, see Some
Comments on the Polish Legal System; infra pp;'312-15 and Some
Comments on the Legal Systems of Communist Countries, infra p. 216.
3 3Schlesinger, op. cit. supra n. 8, at 70-72.
34 On the distinction made in this-Study between "Reports" and
"Annotations," see infra, Part III (1) of the-present Intro-
duction. See alsb Some Comments on the Italian-Legal System,
infra pp. 298-99.
the General Reports had been completed, a number-of them were most
helpfully annotated, from the standpoint'of the-Greek legal system,
by Professor Constantine-J. Simantiras of,thetniversity of
Thessaloniki.3 5 In all of these instancesit has-been found that
the effort involved in such re-checking; while-by-no-means negli-
gible, is relatively'minor compared-to-the-task-of evolving the
General Reports in the first place.36 As far as the results are
concerned, the re-checking experiments-almost'invariably have
borne out the statements in the General-Reports, including those
which embody a finding of unanimity on a'given'point.
(4) Methods of Research
Whoever undertakes multilateral comparative research.must
adjust his methods to a fundamental and-unalterable fact: that
no single human being, however learned, possesses-enough knowledge
of diverse legal systems to assemble and-'correctly't'understand
all of the theoretical and practical- information-on-national
laws which forms the necessary raw-material~for~comparison. Team-
work of a number of lawyers, each of whom must:be-thoroughly
familiar with doctrine and practice in one or-more-of-the legal
systems chosen, thus seems to-be-indispensable.
It follows that the first-step, after determination of the
field of study and of the legal systems'to:be-constdered; must
be the selection of the members-of the teami- Once-this-is accom-
plished, the actual research effortcan-begin:- In-the operation
of the Cornell Project, this effort was-divided-into-four'successive
stages:
(a) In order to elicit from-each:participating:scholar the
necessary mass of detailed-information-on-the-legal-system or
systems covered by him, and to make sure:that all-participants
always addressed themselves-to the same-issue,-the-project.director
had to prepare and circulate-a memorandum'setting'forth the ques-
351t is hoped that these Greek Annotations,-which are on
file in the Cornell law library, will-be published'at a-later date.
36 Such re-checking should beparticularly~interesting with
respect to the Scandinavian systems, whichpresent-original
solutions on some of the controversialzproblems-in this area
(and which, but for budgetary limitations- would'have been
covered in the course of the present Study).
tions to be answered. This memorandum; whichwas-divided and sub-
divided into a number of units, was'calledothe-Working Paper.
(b) In response to the Working-Paper;-everyparticipant pre-
pared one or more national reportsyreferred:to-aslIndividual
Reports.
(c) After the individual-reports had-been'exchanged and
studied by all,'they were-orally discussed and;-Whenever necessary,
supplemented in the light of'such discussion.
(d) Growing out of this discussion; but-constituting a sep-
arable part of it, an intensive effort was made-to formulate in
General'Reports the-emerging'areas of agreement and-of disagree-
ment among legal systems.
What follows is an attempt-briefly to-describe each of these
four stages. 1
(a) THE WORKING PAPER
The-purpose of the Working-Paper-made:it'necessary to string
together a large number of questions; Every-question-was in effect
an inquiry directed to-each-of-the-participatingscholars, asking
him with reference to a specific point-to-state-the-position of
the legal system or systems covered-by him;--It'was-clear from
the outset that these questions had to-be-formulated'in-such a way
that our colleague from-India-would'understand-them-in.the same
way as our colleague from-Italy;- If'the questions-had been asked
in abstract legalterms;'each participant-might have'read parti-
cular notions of his own-legal-system into-such-terms,.and the
result would have been the-complete lack-of-a-common focus. It
was decided, therefore, to ask the questions-in-factual terms.
Each unit of the Working Paper consisted-of-a'series of fact
situations, usually taken-from reported-cases; connected perhaps
1For-a more detailed discussion-of-the-methodological ques-
tions which are only briefly-touched-upon-in'this Introduction,
see Schlesinger, The Common-Gore-of-LegalSystems=An Emerging
Subject,of-Comparative Study, in-the-volumeTWENTIETH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW -- LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E.
YNTEMA 65 ff., esp. 72-79 (1961); Schlesinger-and-Bonassies, Le
fonds commun des systimes-juridiues,.-15 REVUE INTERNATIONALEDE
DROIT COMPARE 501 (1963).
by some comments and brief clarifying questions.* Because-of the
enormous wealth of case material to be found'in-the-United States,
many of the fact situations were taken-from-American-cases; but
cases from other countries; especially-from-England'and Germany,
were used as well.
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The participants were instructed-to-regard-each of these
fact situations as an inquiryseeking'to elicit-ananswer to the
following questions: How would the legal system-or'systems covered
by you react to this fact situation? Would the-court-hold in favor
of the plaintiff or the defendant?--If for-the plaintiff;-what would
be the kind and measure of'relief-awarded-to-him?--What are the
authorities supporting your conclusion,-and-what-is its doctrinal
basis?
The method of using fact situations as-the-initial.focus of
legal comparison--briefly called'the-factualmethod-has-been
discussed in more detail elsewhere. 3 . In the-course-of-the Cornell
Project, the method served-its purpose-well:-*It-is-fair-to say
that not a single instance occurred in which'the-participants
were unsure or in disagreement as-to-the issue-to-be-addressed.
They often questioned each other's arguments-or-conclusions; but
their discussion, whether or not they agreed on-the answer to a
given question, was-always focused-on the-same-question.
The factual method, however, is not a-panacea for all of
the problems of comparative research; In using it;-one must keep
in mind that there are several-kinds-of "facts.""As-long as one
deals with factual events of the-natural:orphysicalworld, it
is reasonable to assume that several such-events; even'though they
have occurred in differentplaces,-aresimilar-to-each other if
ordinary language describes-them-in-similar'terms;--But-one cannot
necessarily indulge in the same assumption if-the'"facts"-c6nsist
2 The preference for common law-and-German-cases was not
entirely accidental. In someof-the'non--German.-speaking civil
law countries, e.g., France'and Italy,-the decisions of the highest
courts usually are reported in-such-a-manner-that-the facts--the
most important ingredient-of the-decision-for-the purpose at
hand--are not clearly stated:- See-infra-Some-Comments on the
Italian Legal System. See also SCHLESINGER; COMPARATIVE LAW
316 (2d ed. 1959).
3See Schlesinger, loc. cit. supra n. 1.
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wholly or in part of institutional elements;-i.e., of elements
differently formed by the history; the mores;-the'ethics and--
indeed--by the laws of different-communities; "To:base.comparative
legal research on the assumption-of-similarity;'or even of com-
parability, of such institutional facts;-often'involves'the danger
of self-deception and circular-reasoning;- This-danger is par-
ticularly acute in the-area of public-law;-where'virtually all
of the "facts" are of the institutional kind-and'heavily colored
by the social and political'peculiarities of different systems
and communities.
4
In many of the'private law'fields, however,,onenormally
expects that institutional as well as physical'facts'occurring
in different parts of the-world can be'compared:without dis-
torting the words expressing such-facts;-:This-is'particularly
true in the law of contracts; At-every'step-of the'work conducted
by the Cornell Project, the participants cross-examined each other
concerning-business practices and other:factual-elements of the
transactions under discussion. Certain:national'or-regional
differences in business practices were found;'and sometimes noted
in individual or general reports. 5 "'Differences'in'the law of
procedure and of evidence also have-to-be:watched'if'one wishes
to be sure that the facts reported; e.g;; in an English case and
"the same" facts found by'an Austrian-court are-truly-comparable.
But in spite of constant attention to'such~dangers, and of.the
group's generally skeptical-attitude-toward-the-comparability of
4 See Mosler, Introduction to the-volume VEHFASSUNGSGERICHTS-
BARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART (Beitrfge zumauslgndischen*'ffentlichen
Recht und V8lkerrecht No. 36), at XVII-XVIII (1962); Strebel,
Introduction to the colloquium STAAT UND PRIVATEIGENTUM (Beitrdge
zum ausl~ndischen Uffentlichen Recht-und-Vb*lkerrecht No. 34),
at 3 (1960).
5E.g., regarding the-practice of sellers,,in some'(but appar-
ently not all) countries,-of'authorizing-their'traveling salesmen
only to solicit but never to make offers; See-B-4.
Note was taken, also, of attempts:at'international-or regional
unification of relevant business'practices;-such-as'the ECE and
COMECON conditions.
Sometimes it was noted-(e.g:;with-respect-to'letters of
confirmation, see B-5, subd. I-E(3))that a'certain fact situation,
while occurring in all legal systems under consideration, had
given rise to much more reported litigation-in-some'systems than
in others. An attempt was made, but not-always-with'success, to
find the reasons explaining this phenomenon.
institutional facts, virtually allof:the.numerous-fact:situations
collected in the Working Paper and later~added-inthe course of
discussion were found-to pass the-test:- truly:similar-fact sit-
uations have occurred, or could-easily-occur; in-all-of the legal
systems under consideration.6 Thus it:can be:statedwith some
assurance that the factual method.---thoughit-might'be'exposed to
more severe strains when used in-comparative:research-on other
subjects--has proved workable in'the-area:of-this-particular
project. Indeed, in thepresent-state of'the-art; the factual
approach may well be indispensable-if multilateral-comparison is
to lead to a detailed and accurate-statement*of-areas-of-agreement
and of disagreement.
The Working Paper was,-of-course; broken-down-into-units and
sub-units, but with the express understanding-that-the-organization
thus proposed would not be binding on-the group; In the course
of the later discussions, and-in the-light-of'new'insights gained
by comparison of the solutions found in-various'legal'systems, the
participants actually proceeded to -change the:original organization
in a few places. On the whole, however;-,the-organization of
the Working Paper met with approval.
The organization of the present*Study:reflects-that of the
Wroking Paper, as subsequently (and unanimously)-modified by the
participants.
After having served its-purpose of eliciting-responses having
a common focus, and of tentatively-suggesting-the units and se-
quence of discussion, the Working Paper became:functus officio.
It was decided, therefore, not to-publish it; -But-most of the
reported cases which furnished the-fact situations-presented in
the Working Paper, are clearly identified'in'the'present Study,
in each instance in the national report covering the-legal system
from which the particular case was taken. ln.other words, an
American Working-Paper case is identified; at-the-appropriate
6Cum grano salis, the statement in the'text-issupportable
even with respect to the socialist systems;-but-there are some
fact situations which do not easily-occur-under-such-a system:
e.g., private auctions (A-2) or'assignments of-offers (B-l).
Generally, as to the particular problems-of-comparability arising
with respect to the socialist systems;-see-supra;Part II(3)(b)
of this Introduction.
place, in the American Report, a-German Working-Paper-case in the
Austrian-German-Swiss Report; etc. In-this-way-the'readerhas an
opportunity, if he wishes;-to ascertain whatofact'situations
were used as the principal starting-points-for-discussion and com-
parison.
(b) INDIVIDUAL REPORTS
The participants' responses,-divided'into-the'same units and
sub-units as the Working-Paper; took-the-form-of-Individual
Reports, sometimes referred to as National Reports., In their
original form, these IndividualbReports-usually-consisted of two
parts. Within each unit;'the reporter-(i)°showed-how the legal
system or systems covered by him'would-react-to'the-various fact
situations posed in the pertinent unit-of-the-Working-Paper. Leading
up to this discussion of-fact situations; or-following it, each
individual reporter also set forth (ii)-the-doctrinal framework
within which the problems inherent-in:the-fact'situations would
be solved in the country or countries'in-question:"Such an exam-
ination of the "theories," by-the use of wbich.the various legal
systems solve the problem at handy'is-not-renderedunnecessary by
the factual approach. To initiate-thediscussionby concentra-
ting on-a fact situation, has the advantage of-makingsure that
all participants address-themselves-to-the-same-question. But
in order correctly to understand-the'respective-answers given by
the various legal systemsand the ramifications-to-which these
answers may lead in somewhat different but-related-fact-situations,
one must become familiar-with the-classificatory:scheme,.the con-
cepts and-techniques-in terms of-whicheach-system-has developed
its answer.]
Through the process-of-discussion:and-drafting-described below,
comparison of the Individual-Reports led:tothe~formulation of
General Reports. These General Reports- could -not, have- been written
if a common focus had not been'initially:established-by-the use of
the factual method. But as'the-work-progressed;°and the dis-
7 For further discussion-of-the-importance-of-examining
"theories" in the course-of-a-comparison-based-on-the factual
approach, see Schlesinger,,op:,cit: supran;l, at 77.
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cussion, branching out from the-fact situations-initially chosen,
proceeded to cover more ground-in-increasingly-systematic fashion,
it became possible to formulatetheGeneraliReports-on a.higher
level of abstraction, and-to-delineate areas-of-agreement and of
disagreement*among-legal systems-in'terms-of-rules;-principles
and trends. The IndividualReports;originally-prepared in re-
sponse to the more limitedinquiries contained'in the Working
Paper, thus had to be revised; and-sometimes-re-organized, in order
to make them responsive to, and supportive-of;-the'General Re-
ports. These revised'Individual*Reports,-and not-the original
ones, are published in the-present-Study;-in-the-process of re-
vision, the Individual Reports-(with very-few-exceptions, specially
indicated by footnotes) were coordinated'with:the-General Reports.
Thus, if the reader becomes interested-ina statement appearing
in subdivision A I (3) (b) (iii) of a given-General-Report, and
he wishes to familiarize himself with-the'position'which; e.g.,
Franch law takes on the point, he will'normally-be-able:to find
the answer and the releventFrench-authorities-in-the corres-
ponding subdivision of the French Report.
This two-step method, which-involved:the:preparation first
of Individual Reports in response to the-Working'Paper, and later
of revised Individual Reports keyed-to the7General-Reports, im-
posed a heavy burden on the participants. -Those-who-organize
future research undertakings of-a similax-nature,-no-doubt will
ask themselves whether there is a way of:avoiding-this double
effort. Perhaps there is, depending on the degree-of-refinement
with which the original Working Paper'or'its-equivalentispre-
pared. It is submitted, however; that-an:overly'ambitious attempt
to anticipate in the Working Paper the-coverageand-systematicity
of the final product, although savingsome~subsequent-labor, may
also have the disadvantage of-forcing the participants' re-
sponses,'i.e., their individual reports; :into-a:rigidly pre-
conceived and hence possibly faulty mold.
(c) ORAL DISCUSSION
Three times--in 1960, 1961 and1964--the-participants met
in Ithaca for intensive workingsessions-'each-of-which lasted
between two and four months; 8 Someof the participants attended
8There was also a one-week planningsession-at'Aix-en-Provence
in the summer of 1963.
all three sessions, others only one or two. 9
During the sessions, the participants:met-very-frequently,
sometimes daily, for round-table discussions:--Occasionally there
were exchanges of views'on-general:problems-of-method-and organ-
ization; at most of the meetings;'-however; the-units and sub-
units of the Working-Paper, and-of-the'Individual-Reports, were
taken up one by one. During the-first-session;-in 1960, the
discussion of each-unit began-with-a-presentation-in-which every
participant, seriatim, summarized-and-explained-his-Individual
Report. This was followed, ineachcase,:by-discussion of that
particular Report and cross-examination-of-the-reporter. Only
after this process was completed with-respect-to-all Individual
Reports, did the participants-turn to-actual:comparison. The
chairman then attempted, at first-orally;-to formulate-certain
areas of agreement and of-disagreement, between-legal systems.
At that point, one of the participants was named as general re-
porter for the particular unit. Using the-oral-summary of the
chairman as his starting point,the-general-reporter-prepared a
first draft which he submitted at the:next-meeting;.Invariably,
a number of successive drafts,-each-in-turn-discussed-and criti-
cized by the group, turned out to-be-necessary-before-consensus
was reached on a GeneralReport.
In the later sessions, it was-found-possible'to-speed up
the processes of discussion: This was accomplished-by sending
out the relevant parts of-the-Working Paper-so-early that the
Individual Reports could be-completed-and-circularized among all
participants at least a month before the beginning-of-the session.
Thus each member of the group had-timeto:familiarize himself
with the other participants' Individual Reports-before-the opening
of the session, and it became-unnecessary.for-each-reporter orally
to present his reports. It'was not intended; -of-course, to give
up the benefit of thorough cross-examination-of-each individual
9 Illness and other accidents'played some-part in-this. More
importantly, since participation-in-these:sessionsoffered'a unique
opportunity for a comparative study'not-only-of-the law'of con-
tracts but also of the style,-the sources-andmethods of other
legal systems, it was thought desirable to'make'such'opportunity
available to a somewhat larger group-than-could-be formed by the
participants in a single session.
reporter; It was still necessary-to-make-sure-that-the~information
contained in each Individual Report-was-clear~and-complete, and
correctly understood by all:--But.in:order-to-expedite-this process
of cross-examination; the:chairman-appointed:the:general:reporter
for each unit some-time-before-that:unit was-taken-up'for-discussion.
The participant thus appointed-madeuit-his-business;-insofar as
that specific unit was concerned,-to-study-all-IndividualReports
with a particularly critical-eye;:-Thus-whenhis" unit was
reached for discussion, the-general'reporter-waszprepared, without
preventing the chairmanand-other-members-of-the:group from:raising
additional questions. to'play the-leading:role-±n-eliciting clari-
fications from all of the individual~reporters.
In the last session,-the-procedure -was-further-streamlined
by authorizing each general-reporter-to-seek:clarifications-from
other individual reporters by-way of:informal manz-to-man con-
versations, and to do so before the-beginning-of the first formal
round-table meeting-devoted to "his"-particular-unit;--The:general
reporter, moreover, was encouraged-to prepare-a-first-preliminary
draft of the General Report at an early-moment;-again-before the
first round-table meeting dealing with the'unitiassigned:to him.
At the meeting, the discussion-thus:immediatelyuconcentrated on
the formulation of areas-of-agreement and-of-disagreement, even
though it was still-necessary;:in the-process:of-such-formulation,
occasionally to seek further-clarification~of:the-position taken
on a difficult point by one-or the-other of'the-legal'systems
under consideration. This short-cut-saved a-great-deal-of time,
compared to the more cumbersome-methods-of:discussion-used during
the first session. One may doubt,-howeveri whether-theuaccelerated
procedure would have worked equally-well-if-the-participants
had not previously become familiar with the:cooperative-processes
by which the General-Reports'had:to:be evolved.
(d) GENERAL REPORTS
The most significant-fact-concerning~the:General Reports is
that they were unanimously adopted:-That-in-order-to-attain such
unanimity, a great deal'of*time had-to:be-consumed-in-discussion
and re-drafting, cannot be denied:-It:is-fair-to-say, on the
other hand, that these-unanimously'adopted-General-Reports are
considerably more accurate and'more refined than the'product of
a single individual, prepared-underhis-sole-responsibility, could
ever be expected to be. This'was'clearly-proved-by-the'experience
of the Cornell Project. Time-after'time;-one-of-the-eminent
scholars participating-in the*Project;:asked-to-act-as-general
reporter in reference"to-a-given'unit; :walked-into'the-meeting
room with a draft General-Report, exuding-confidence-that on the
basis of the Individual'Reports; and-of'his-preliminary conver-
sations with other individualparticipants,'he'had-fullyand accur-
ately stated the areas of-agreement'and'of-disagreement. But,
alas, three or four hours later-he left-the-battlefield with his
confidence considerably shaken; realizing-that-both in organiza-
tion and in'formulation his'draftcontained-mistakes-which in the
course of the meeting--always'with-courtesy and-good'humor, but
also with firmness--were pointed'out to him-by-those who,.of
course, were his superiors in'their knowledge'and-understanding
of legal systems other'than his own. -In'this-manner, each
General Report went through a-considerable-number-of-drafts and
re-drafts until it was finally endorsed by all.1 0
The task of reaching a consensus on points-which-often turned
out to be intricate and dependent-on-fine shades-of-meaning, was
of course rendered more difficult-by the'fact-that-for'the majority
of the participants the'language'used'in the-drafts and the dis-
cussions was not their native tongue: To-be sure;'all'of the
participants were able to express-themselves-fluently in English,
both orally and in writing. Nevertheless; a-residue-of linguistic
difficulty was occasionally-felt; In order-to-overcome this, the
chairman sometimes appointed'a'drafting-sub-committee, one member
of which was a participant-from an'Englishspeaking-country.
Moreover, after the work of the group was-completed;-the chairman
(in his capacity as General Editor) -was-authorized-to-make edi-
torial changes in the General'Reports'as-well-as in the Individual
Reports.
The factual approach'empioyed-in'the'initial-stages of
10It is submitted that-the experience-thusgained~throws
considerable doubt on the accuracy of the-results-reached through
any method of multilateral comparison which relies on a single
general reporter not having the benefit-of-a-true give-and-take
with representatives of all legal systems-under consideration.
comparison had the effect that areas of agreement and of dis-
agreement were discerned inductively rather than deductively.1 1
In this way, specific observations were made before any attempt
to develop generalizations, and a tendency toward specificity
was built into the working method of the group. This tendency
persisted when the stage of formulating the General Reports was
finally reached; the aim was to formulate areas of agreement and
of disagreement with as much specificity as the subject of each
Report would permit.
1 2
It is submitted that the objective of maximum specificity
(though it may not have been attained in all parts of the present
Study) is of great importance in an endeavor of this kind. Only
findings stated with at least a reasonable degree of specificity
can be helpful to those who may have occasion, for whatever pur-
pose to utilize the results of common core research.1 3
Needless to say, no attempt was made in the preparation and
formulation of the General Reports to emphasize areas of agree-
ment more strongly than areas of disagreement. From the beginn-
ing, it had been the declared policy of the Project that the
whole Study be conducted sine ira et studio, without any pre-
conceived notions as to the extent of the "common core," and this
1lFor a discussion of the relative merits of the inductive
and the deductive approach in multilateral comparative research,
see Schlesinger, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 78-79.
1 2As is emphasized in the Scope Note preceding the General
Reports, infra, it has always been thought necessary, in the prep-
aration of the present Study, that the process of negotiation
leading up to the conclusion of a contract be viewed as a whole.
Indeed, an awareness of the functional interconnections among
all of the rules and principles governing this entire process
seems indispensable for a proper understanding of the subject.
It is no doubt desirable (and has been attempted in the General
Reports) to spell out such interconnections not only by way of
cross-references but also in terms of general observations and
explanations. This does not mean, however, that one has to give
up the aim of specificity in the statement of particular rules.
1 3This, it is believed, is true with respect to all of the
purposes for which the results of such research are likely to
be used. That specificity is desirable even insofar as findings
may be used to ascertain some of the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," has been pointed out supra,
Part II(l)(b)(aa) of this Introduction.
policy was unwaveringly adhered to by all participants. As the
work progressed, it became abundantly clear that areas of agree-
ment and of disagreement are interlaced, often in subtle ways,
and that it is quite impossible accurately to formulate~an area
of agreement without staking out its limits and thus demarcating
an actual or potential area of disagreement. A negative finding--
i.e., a finding of genuine disagreement among legal systems--
is no less valuable than a finding of agreement. Unless alerted
to the existence and extent of areas of disagreement, a lawyer
or a judge often lightly assumes that a given principle of his
own legal system is so "fundamental" that it must be recognized
by other systems as well. Such an assumption, if unwarranted,
can lead to misunderstandings, frustrated expectations, and
grievous errors in decisions. Thus, for the sake of obviating
such unwarranted and dangerous assumptions, there is merit in a
purely negative finding.' Once the disagreement is clearly under-
stood, and seen in the context of related areas of agreement, the
first step towards solution of any difficulties resulting from
such disagreement will have been taken.
In line with the factual approach initially taken, an effort
was made throughout the General Reports to formulate areas of
agreement and of disagreement interms of the actual solutions
or results reached by the various legal systems, rather than in
terms of mere verbal consonances or dissonances. In a number of
instances it was discovered that surface disagreement between
legal systems, reflected in diametrically opposite "rules,"
disappeared to a large extent when it was considered that each
of the systems in question had engrafted "exceptions" upon its
"rule." In certain situations, the same result might be reached
by some legal systems under their "rule," and in other
systems under one of their "exceptions."
1 4
On the other hand, it was found occasionally that real
differences were concealed behind a facade of verbal consonance.
Even though the same-"rule" is adhered to in all legal systems,
14 See, e.g., Fr. Rept. on B-7, §III. For examples of other,
somewhat more complex ways in which areas of agreement sometimes
are hidden by surface dissimilarities, see infra Part II(5)(a)
of this Introduction.
it may turn out that in certain fact situations-the actual re-
sults differ, either because of exceptions which are-not.common
to all legal systems, or because of the interplay, in some legal
systems, between the seemingly universal "rule" and other norms
or practices. For an example, see General Report on B-3, n. 2.
In order to draw the line between areas of agreement and
of disagreement in terms of actual results reached by the various
legal systems, it was sometimes necessary to resort to novel dis-
tinctions and to categorize fact situations in a manner.which
would be regarded as unorthodox in most or perhaps-all of the
systems under consideration. Even where such new- categories were
employed, however, it was possible in most instances to avoid
the use of unaccustomed terminology. It turned out that, at
least in the area of contract law, the traditional language of
lawyers is sufficiently rich and flexible so that even novel
categories and distinctions could be explained in-terms of that
language. Of course, when traditional terms were used which do
not have the same meaning in all legal systems under consideration
(e.g., "unilateral contract"), it was made clear contextually in
which of the possible meanings the term was employed. In the few
instances in which new terms were coined, or words were used in
a sense other than the ordinary one, definitions or explanations
were given.
(5) Some Observations on the Results Reached
To judge the findings emobodied in the General Reports and
presented herewith will be for the reader. Only a few general, and
somewhat haphazard, observations will be ventured here.
(a) NOVELTY OF FINDINGS
After the completion of their work, the participants in the
Cornell Project asked themselves the agonizing question often
prompted by social science research: did we merely demonstrate
the obvious?
As to the over-all picture emerging from this Study, it might
be said that it bears out previous expectations only in part. On
the one hand, speaking in rough quantitative terms, one can
assert that the areas of agreement are larger than those of dis-
agreement--a finding which probably was expected by most of the
experts in the field. On the other hand, it turned out-that the
areas of agreement and of disagreement cannot be laid out and
demarcated in the simple terms used in earlier comparative dis-
cussions, but that these areas are intertwined in subtler and more
complex ways than had been surmised.1 4a
Turning from the broad-over-all picture to the specific
findings, again one observes a mixture of the expected and the
unexpected.
Clearly, in many instances the results reached were the ones
which an experienced international practitioner would have anti-
cipated. But there were findings that will come as a surprise
to many, and that in several instances were unexpected by the
majority of the participants themselves.
In numerous instances, the General Reports show that by
comparing actual results an area of agreement among legal systems
could be found where none was suspected, or that a known area of
agreement in reality was larger than had been surmised. To the
superficial observer it would appear, for example, that there is
a wide area of disagreement between those legal systems in which
offers are normally irrevocable, and the other systems in which
14aThe principal reason for this, it is submitted, lies in the
complexity of the historical forces which have shaped the law of
contracts in the various legal systems. The crazy-quilt pattern of
the common core of those systems perhaps becomes less surprising
if one considers the influences, always differing in degree and in
mixture from country to country, which have contributed to the
development (and to the limits) of the common core. Even the most
superficial list of such contributing factors would have to include:
(a) The complex interaction between the germinal systems, to
wit Roman law, common law, canon law, the law merchant, the
school of "natural law," and the teachings of the Pan-
dectists;
(b) overseas migrations of European and European-derived sys-
tems (both of the common law and the civil law type);
(c) borrowing (voluntary or otherwise) of entire systems or
parts of systems; and
d) eclectic borrowing of particular solutions (such as
borrowings from the former Polish Code-of Obligations in
the Egyptian Civil Code, or Field Code influences on the
Indian Contract Act).
The complex operation of these multiple factors is illus-
trated in many of the Individual Reports.
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offers are normally revocable. Long before the initiation of the
present Study, it had been pointed out by Nussbaum and others that
this area of disagreement is considerably narrowed if one takes
into consideration not only the rules'concerning revocability but
also the related rules dealing with the time when the acceptance
becomes effective. In the course of the-Cornell Project it was
found that in terms of the actual results reached in concrete
situations the area of disagreement becomes even less significant
if one considers not only the two sets of rules dealing-with reco-
cability and time of effectiveness of the acceptance, but als6 a
host of other rules and doctrines--some of them not limited to the
law of contracts--which often impinge on the pertinent fact sit-
uations. See General Report on A-12, §III, and General. Report
on B-9, subd. III B (2). To mention but one further example:
the supposed contrast between common law and civil law systems caused
by the peculiar common law doctrine of unilateral contracts was
found, upon closer inspection, to produce only minor differences
in actual results. See General Report on B-6.
On the other hand, throughout the General Reports, one finds
that there is occasional unexpected disagreement on matters of
detail, although all legal systems pronounce the sameowell-known
general rule. In some instances, even the seasoned comparativists
participating in the Project were frankly surprised when they
discovered that one or more legal systems registered a dissent from
a proposition which many had taken for granted. For example, the
possibility that an undeclared revocation, which has-never come
to the knowledge of the offeree, might effectively destroy the
offer in a modern legal system (see General Report on A-11, subs.
III B), had not.occurred to most of the participants until they
read the French Report.1 4b
An element of the unexpected is noticeable,-also, in many of
the Individual Reports. Basically, these reports are memoranda
on certain aspects of a given legal system, prepared by experts
who were familiar with that system, and in most instances brought
up in it. Under these circumstances, one might expect the Indi-
14bThe mere suggestion of a solution which in effect would
correspond to the French rule on this point was called "monstrous"
by Mr. Justice Holmes. See Amer. Rept. on A-12, subs. II A.
vidual Reports to be similar in approach to non-comparative mono-
graphs or articles, or chapters of treatises, and to duplicate what
other authors in the particular country have said-on the subject
at hand. In reality, it is submitted, many of the Individual
Reports have a very different character. An ordinary monograph,
article or treatise, prepared by a local author for local con-
sumption, answers only those questions which-on the basis of local
tradition and experience occur to that particular author. The
Individual Reports prepared for the Cornell Project, on the other
hand, constituted the responses, as it were,-to questions asked
from the outside. Whether suggested by'the fact situations in the
original Working Paper, or reflecting new points brought up in the
oral discussions, the questions to be answered-in-the revised
Individual Reports frequently had been framed, at least.in part, in
the light of the thinking and the experience of countries other
than the respondent's. In a number of instances it turned out that
a given question had not previously occurred to anybody, or at
least had never been asked in the same systematic context, in the
respondent's country. Thus faced with a (to him) novel.question,
an individual reporter often found himself compelled to take a
fresh look at the statutory and decisional law of his own legal
system, with results which occasionally will strike the readers
in his home country as distinctly unorthodox.
(b) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1964 HAGUE
CONVENTION
The Diplomatic Conference which was held at The Hague in
April 1964, resulted in the formulation of two proposed inter-
national conventions. The first of these conventions embodies a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, the second a
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods.15 In the present context, interest is primarily
centered on the proposed Uniform Formation of Contracts Law; for
1 5For the text of both conventions, see SOME COMPARATIVE AS
PECTS OF THE LAW RELATING TO SALE OF GOODS (Int'l & Comp. L.Q.,
Supplemental Publication No. 9 [19641) 60 ff.; 13 AM. J. COMP. L.
451 (1965); 30 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 326 (1965); 54 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 205 (1965); 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
166 ff. (1965).
the sake of brevity, it will hereafter be referred to as.Uniform
Law.15a As of January 1967, the Convention embodying this Uni-
form Law had been signed by twelve nations;1 6 but-as of-the same
date no ratifications had been deposited, and-no- country had
acceded to the Convention.1 7 On the assumption, however, that
by the coming into force of the Convention- or perhaps by volun-
tary adoption, the Uniform Law will become-incorporated into
the legislation of some countries,1 8 the question-may be asked
whether and in what way the provisions of the Uniform Law and the
findings presented in this Study bear upon each other.
The first point that should be noted in this connection is
the limited coverage of the Uniform Law. It applies only in
situations in which the contemplated or alleged- contract is a
contract of sale, while the present Study deals with-the forma-
tion of contracts of all kinds. The scope of the Uniform Law
is further restricted to the sale of goods; moreover, the sale of
investment securitieS, negotiable instruments; ships, aircraft
and electricty is expressly-exempted from its coverage. Further-
more, the Uniform Law applies only if the contemplated sale of
15aThe English text of the Uniform Law (but not the Con-
vention to which it is annexed) is reproduced as an Appendix at
the very end of this Study.
16Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands; San Marino, the
United Kingdom and Vatican City. Richard D. Kearney, Esquire,
Deputy Legal Adviser, U. S. Department of State, was kind enough
to give this information to the author in a letter dated January
27, 1967.
The Hague Conference of April, 1964, had been attended, and
its Final Act (see the first of the-publications listed in n. 15
supra) had been signed, by representatives of a considerably
larger number of nations.
1 7See supra n. 16. According to its Article VIII, the Con-
vention "shall come into force six months from the date of the
deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification or accession."
There is no time limit for ratification-or accession. In respect
of a state that ratifies or accedes to the Convention after it
comes into force, Article VIII provides that the Convention shall
become effective six months after the-date of the-deposit of its
instrument of ratification or accession.
18The practical significance of ratification or accession may
vary from signatory to signatory, as the-Convention permits far-
reaching reservations. See Articles II and III- of the Convention.
See also Article I, paragraph 3 of the Convention-in conjunction
with Article V of the Sales Convention.
goods is an international sale,'as defined in its Art. 1.19 Any
signatory may, in addition, by way. of reservations place.further
restrictions upon the scope of the Uniform Law's applicability. 2 0
Thus it is clear that even in the unlikely event of universal
adoption of the Uniform Law, its provisions.would apply only to
a relatively small segment-of all contractual transactions.
Within the ambit of its limited scope the Uniform Law, it
is submitted, may well have the effect of enhancing rather than
reducing the need for daty compiled by comparative research.
2 1
This becomes apparent when one considers (aa) the problem of gaps
in the Uniform Law, (bb) the methods that may be employed.for its
interpretation, and (cc) the treatment of usages in the Uniform Law.
(aa) The Uniform Law does not deal with problems of essen-
tial validity or of vices de consentement. Like the present Study,
it addresses itself to the mechanics (or, as a civilian might say,
the external manifestations) of consenting-to a contract. Even
within this specific topic of Formation of Contracts, however,
the Uniform Law leaves a number of issues completely or virtually
1 9If a signatory adopts both the Uniform Sales Law and the
Uniform Formation of Contracts Law, the definition of international
sales will be taken from Art. 1 of the Sales Law. See Annex II,
Art. 1 of the Formation of Contracts Convention.
2 0See supra n. 18. Concerning the intricate problems, es-
pecially conflict of laws problems, which may arise from the use
or non-use. of such reservations see the articles cited suprap. 16;
see also Nadelmann, The Conflicts Problems of the Uniform aw on
the International Sale of Goods, 1V AM. J. COMP. L. 236 (195)-
where further references can b& found.
2 1The literature on the Uniform Law--much of it comparative--
already has grown to substantialproportions. See, e.g., von
Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz uber die internationale Verein-
heitlichung des Kaufrechts vom 2. bis 25. April 1964: "Di6 Ergeb-
nisse der Konferenz hinsich lich derVereinheitlichung des Rechts
des Ab--hlusses von Kaufvertrdgen, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 101
T1965); Folke Schmidt, The International Contract Law in the Con-
text of Some of Its SourcesT 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1965; Honnold,
A Comparison of National and Regional Unifications-of the Law of
Sales and Avenues Toward Their Harmonization, in UNIFICATION OF THE
LAW GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 3ff. (Honnold ed.,
1966); Goldstajn, The Formation of the Contract, id. at 41 ff.;
Lagergren, Formation of Contract, id. at 55 ff. See also the
recent (1966) artiles by Gorla and Longo listed in Part IV B
(1) of t~is Introduction.
untouched.
Only some examples can be mentioned here. The Uniform Law
in no way refers to the problem of assignment of offers (see
infra, General Report and Individual Reports on B-i), even though
the concept of "offer" in Art. 4 may be broad enough-to include an
offer contained in an option. More importantly, there is no
express provision dealing with the problem of the countless
contracts concluded without ascertainable sequence of offer and
acceptance (see infra, General Report and Individual Reports on
C-1). In dealing with the requirement of definiteness of the offer
(see infra, General Report and Individual Reports on A-3), the
Uniform Law (Art. 4) employs such general terms that, as has been
said by an eminent expert, "it is, of course, necessary to make
comparative investigations" of the various approaches to.the prob-
lem in order to resolve doubtful cases, especially cases involving
open price terms.2 1 a The problems which arise when a writing or
other formality contemplated by the parties fails to come into
existence (see infra, General Report and Individual Reports on
C-2), are only tangentially recognized in the Uniform Law.
2 2
It has been argued, moreover, that the subject of offers.to the
public (see infra, General Report-andIndividual Reports on A-7) is
not covered by the Uniform Law.23
2 1aLagergren, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 57.
2 2The only provisions of the Uniform Law having a bearing
on these problems seem to be Art. 2, which deals broadly with usages
and party autonomy, and Art. 4, which requires that an offer show
tle offeror's intention to be bound; but neither of these provisions
supplies sufficient criteria for determining whether and under
what circumstances a formality contemplated-by the parties should
be regarded as constitutive.
On the other hand, the Uniform Law in Art. 3 makes it clear
that neither the offer nor the acceptance is subject-to a statute
of frauds or other form requirement-imposed-by law. The present
Study does not deal with form requirements imposed-by law (see
Scope Note, infra). This, it would seem, is the only topic
covered in the Uniform Law but not in the present Study.
2 3 See von Caemmerer, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 118-19. The
question is controversial. Schmidt, op. cit. supra n. 21, at
6-9, mentions a Report by Professor Hellner which-apparently takes
the view that proposals addressed to the public are treated in
Art. 4, and that under the rule laid down in that provision such
proposals cannot constitute offers. Quaere whether Professor
Hellner's view can be squared with the provision of Art. 2,
which seems to indicate that the proponent is the master of his
The draftsmen of the Uniform Law, who deliberately refrained
from burdening the Law with too much detail, probably.were aware
of the existence of such gaps in their text. Recognizing that the
task of gap-filling would fall to the courts, the draftsmen ex-
pressly--though negatively-alluded to the sources-to which the
courts will have to resort for this purpose. As has been noted
in Part II (1) (b) (cc) of this Introduction; the Uniform Law
contains a provision excluding rules of private international law
"for the purpose of the application of the present Law." Thus it
is perfectly clear that the gaps may not be filled by the appli-
cation of a single local law selected pursuant to the rules of
private international law;24- What is less clear,-is what source
or sources of law may, or indeed should, be-utilized for the
purpose. It is submitted that the answer to this question may
to some extent depend on whether one speaks in theoretical or prac-
tical terms. In theory, one can easily agree with the view of
Professor von Caemmerer, one of the leading participants in the
Hague Conference, that gaps in the provisions of the Uniform Law
must be filled, with due regard for the.purposes and spirit of
proposal, and thus can give such proposal (including-a proposal
addressed to the public) the character of an offer if he so
desires and if he sufficiently expresses his desire? In Pro-
fessor Schmidt's opinion, the whole problem is a difficult one;
he fears that courts in different countries may well arrive at
different solutions. See also n. 24 infra.
24 Occasionally it may be doubtful whether one deals with a
"gap" (which must be filled without reference-to rules of private
international law), or whether the point in question-is so com-
pletely outside of the scope of "the present Law" that even the
provision excluding rules of-private international law cannot
apply (in which case the governing law would have to be ascer-
tained by the application of ordinary conflicts-rules). With
reference, e.g., to the problem of public offers (supra n. 23),
it has been suggested that the problem "is left outside the scope
of theConvention and must; therefore,-be decided .. in conformity
with the provisions of the proper law;" Lagergren, op 'cit. supra
n. 21, at 57. Quaere, however, whether this particular problem,
insofar as it relates to contemplated-sales of goods, is really
more than a gap problem within the general ambit of "the present
Law," especially in view of the breadth of Art. 2?
Questions of vices de consentement, or questions relating
to transactions not involving the sale of goods, are-clearly out-
side the scope of the Uniform Law; hence they continue to be
governed by the law of the country to which (taking proper account
of the partiesT intentions) the forum's conflicts rules may refer.
the Law, by falling back on its "bases in comparative law.",2 5
Whether or not one adopts this-particular formula, itseems plain
that the express provision of the Uniform Law prohibiting resort
to a single local law compels a comparative-approach whenever
gaps in the text of the Uniform'Law have to be filled.
In practice it may turn out that courts will use a different
and more simple-minded method when they are faced with gaps in the
Uniform Law. In such a case, a court may well fall back on its
own local law, especially when it has-received-no adequate help
from counsel (or from institutes of comparative law, where such
institutes exist) in assembling information-on the rilevant law
of other countries.2 6 Thus the same gap may be filled in diff-
erent ways by courts sitting in different countries. To the extent
that this happens, the Uniform Law will have failed to-bring about
uniformity, and the legal advisers-of international traders will
be confronted with the same diversity of national-laws as exists
today.
Thus it is clear that, whatever approach is taken, the gaps
in the Uniform Law will confront the-legal practitioner, either
as advocate or as counsel, with problems calling-from-comparative
research.
(bb) The resources of comparative law will be required, also,
for the interpretation of the positive provisions-of-the Uniform
Law. As has been mentioned- the Uniform Law is-tersely dravm;
matters of detail are not always spelled out, so that questions of
interpretation are bound to arise.
The specific provisions of the Uniform Law-cannot be under-
stood, and hence cannot be intelligently interpreted, without
regard to their historical and intellectual origins These ori-
2 5Von Caemmerer, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 112. The Uniform
Sales Law contains a provision (Art. 17) to the effect that "Ques-
tions concerning matters governed by the-present Law which are not
expressly settled therein shall be settled in-conformity with the
general principles on which the present'Law-is-based t' At least
in those countries in which-both-Uniform Laws-are-adopted, it may
be expected that this provision-will-be analogously-applied in
the context of the Uniform Formation-of Contracts Law; -even though
the latter Law does not contain an-express provision-to the same
effect. See von Caemmerer, id. at 111.
26See Schmidt, loc. cit. supra n. 21.
gins vary from provision to provision. Even an eclectic-and super-
ficial survey (and no more than that-is intended-to'be submitted
here) discloses at least four different categories:
(i) There are several-provisions which,-as-shown by the
present Study, reflect a consensus-amonglegal-systems; and merely
seek to codify the essence of such consensus. As examples, one
might mention Art. 2, para. 2;-which declares-invalid a term of
the offer stipulating that-silence shall amount-to- acceptance, and
the provision in Art. 5, para. 1,-which-confirms-the rule that an
offer does not become effective if its-withdrawal-is-communicated
to the offeree before or at the sametime-as the offer. As these
provisions have been born of consensus,-it-would seem that in
doubtful or borderline cases their-interpretation will require
careful examination of the extent of-such-consensus.
(ii) At the opposite-extreme, one-finds'a-small number of
provisions in the Uniform Law-which-seem-to have no'exact pre-
cursor in any national system, but--perhaps-for the-purpose of
effecting a compromise among-conflicting national solutions--
were independently fashioned-by the draftsmen-.-The example which
most readily comes to-mind is the provision in-Art.-5, para. 2,
pursuant to which a normally-revocable offer cannot be revoked if
the revocation "is not made in good faith or-in-conformity with
fair dealing." This provision has been criticized as-too vague,
and fear has been expressed that it will-be-differently inter-
preted by courts in different countries. 27
(iii) In a number of instances, the draftsmen of-the Uniform
Law have made a conscious choice between conflicting solutions
reflected in diverse national systems. To mention but one ex-
ample, Art. 11 provides that-normally the formation-of the.con-
tract "is not affected by the-death of one of the parties or by
2 7See Schmidt, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 14-15.
A novel solution-is-presented, also, by Art. 7, para. 2,
dealing with qualified acceptances. Here the Uniform Law intro-
duces a rule quite opposed to traditional thinking- -Although the
provision may have been influenced in some-way by Scandinavian and'
American solutions, it differs both from the pertinent section
of the Uniform Scandinavian Contract-Act and-from §2-207 of the
American Uniform Commercial Code. See'Schmidt, id. at 23-25;
Honnold, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 10-11; Lagergren, o. cit. supra
n. 21, at-68-6-9
his becoming incapable of contracting before acceptance." In-
sofar as revocable offers-are-concerned; this-is- consistent with
some but contrary to other national laws., See infra, General
Report on A-13, subs. II B. In interpreting such a provision, the
courts will have to take note of-commentaries and judicial pre-
cedents in those countries whose-position has'been adopted.
(iv) Occasionally a compromise between conflicting national
positions has been effected;-not-by-free invention of an inter-
mediate solution (see supra, under (ii)), but-by conflation of
elements taken from different systems. -An illustration.is fur-
nished by Art. 5, para. 4, one of the most interesting-provisions
of the Uniform Law, which renders ineffective a revocation
reaching the offeree after he has-dispatched-his-acceptance or
(in a proper case) his performance. This must be-read together
with Arts. 6 and 12, which provide-that in general-an-acceptance
becomes effective only when-it is received by the offeror. A
correct understanding of these provisions can be achieved.only if
one keeps in mind that here the draftsmen havecombined elements
taken in part from the civil law systems-adhering-to theltheory
of "reception," and in part from-the "mailbox"-doctrine.of the
common law.28 Read together, the provisions-rather-clearly in-
dicate that (1) for the purpose of determining the timeliness and
effectiveness of a revocation of the offer;-the-timeoof dispatch
of the acceptance shall be-decisive, but that-(2)-for all other
purposes, including the purpose of-allocating the risk of loss
or delay of the declaration of acceptance;-the-effectiveness of
the acceptance depends on its-having reachedthe offeror. 2 9
Among European commentators, there is controversy on the
point just mentioned;3 0 but there is agreement-that-provisions such
as Art. 5, para. 4, and Arts. 6 and 12, which-embody-a composite
solution derived from several different-legal-systems, can be
correctly interpreted only if full use-is made-of-the armory
of comparative law.
2 8 See von Caemmerer, op. cit.-supra n. 21, at 122.
2 9For somewhat similar suggestions-(in the context-of American
law) see Macneil, Time of-Acceptance: 'Too-Many-Problems for a
Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (96 ;a-slightly revised
version of this article appears infra as Appendix'to'the American
Report on B-9.
3 0Von Caemmerer, op. cit. supra n. 21, at 122, supports the
(cc) According to Art. 2, para. 1, the substantive pro-
visions of the Uniform Law are inapplicable-"to- the extent that
it appears from... usage that other-rules-apply "- Usage thus
has overriding significance in-the statutory-scheme.--Article 13
defines usage as "anypractice or method-of-dealing-which reason-
able persons, in the same situation-as-the-parties;-usually con-
sider to be applicable to the formation of-their-contract. '" It
has been suggested that a-rule-of law,oe.g. -ofdecisional law,
existing-both in the country of the-seller and-thecountry of
the buyer, may be regarded as constituting; or-giving-rise to, a
practice which must be recognized as'a usage.3 1 If this sugges-
tion,which seems eminently sound, is adopted by-the'courts, al-
most any provision of the Uniform Law could-be overriden by a
showing that a different-rule, prevailing in-the countries of
both parties, has created or recognized a "practice...*.which rea-
sonable persons, in the same situation-as the-parties, usually
consider to be applicable to the formation-of-their'contract."1
This supplies an additional reason why comparative'legal date--
in this instance, data normally limited to the countries of the
parties--remain of crucial significance under the regime of the
Uniform Law.
If the Convention embodying the-Uniform Law-enters into force,
and after it has been in force for three years, any Contracting
State, with the concurrence of at-least-one-quarter-of the other
Contracting States, will have the right to demand the convening
of a conference for the purpose of revising-the Convention or
the Uniform Law. 32
Unification of the law of international sales-in thus rec-
ognized as a continuing task. At-the'same'time, private and
view taken in the text supra. For-a different view-,see Schmidt,
op. cit. supra n. 21, at 19-23.
3 1 Von Caemmerer, op. cit. supra n.21, at 126, makes the
suggestion in the limited context of the'"practice"'of treating
letters of confirmation as approved if the recipient does not
promptly object. There is no reason, however; why-other "prac-
tices" created or recognized by decisional-or statutory'law in the
countries of the parties should-not equally-qualify as usages
within the meaning of Art. 13.
3 2Article XII of the Convention. Cf. Recommendation II
contained in the Annex to the Final Act of the Diplomatic Con-
ference held at The Hague in-April 1964.
official international organizations undoubtedly will carry on
their work of drafting and refining standard forms and conditions
for many branches of trade. 3 2a It is the hope of the authors that
the present Study will make a contribution, however modest, to
this constant and important process of facilitating trade by
measures of unification, of harmonization, and of-mutual education.
(c) GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON COMPARISON OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
The concrete findings presented in these volumes are strictly
limited to the subject of Formation of Contracts; but as in many
large-scale comparative studies, the unarticulated'by-products of
the work process may be at least as significant as the contribu-
tion made in the area of the specified subject matter. In the
intensive and prolonged round-table discussions at Ithaca, each
participant had a truly unique opportunity to probe into, and to
get a new understanding of, the inner workings of several legal
systems other than his own. At the same time, all participants
helped in developing, and became fully conversant with, the methods
of comparison described above. It is already apparent that some
of the participants--in their capacities as deans, directors of
institutes, or individual law teachers--are translating the Cornell
Project's factual approach into novel methods of-teaching compara-
tive law. The impetus of the group's common experience is carried,.
also, into individual research projects, dealing with problems of
national,3 3 regional or international range.34
Professor Bonassies has eloquently testified to the "sub-
Jective" advantages which each member of the team derived from the
process of mutual education inherent in the project.3 5 There
3 2aSee Honnold, loc. cit. supra n. 21.
3 3See Gorla, Lo studio interno e comparativo-della giuris-
prudenza e i suoi presupposti: le raccolte e le'tecniche per la
interpretazione delle sentenze, U7 FORO ITALIANO, Part V, pp. 73
ff. (1964); see also Gorla, "Ratio decidendi;" principio di diritto
(e "obiter dictum").--A proposito di alcunesentenze-in tema di
revoca dell'offerta contrattuale, id. at 90 ff.
34See, e.g., Lorenz, General Principles of Law: Their Elab-
oration in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 13
AM. J. COMP. L. 1 -(9a); Longo, Diritti dell'Europa Continentale
e Common Law--Nuove prospettive di ravvicinamento, 5 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO EUROPEO 303 (1965).
3 5See his part of the article by Schlesinger and Bonassies,
Le fonds commun des systemes juridigues--Observations sur un ouvea
projet de recherches, 15 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE
rm_ at q-i8_46 T-io-F;7
is no doubt that every participant came away from the Ithaca
sessions with new ideas regarding his own legal system as well as
the methods and objectives of Comparative Law. Apart from what is
embodied in the General Reports, however, the thoughts stimulated
in the mind of each individual participant, and the conclusions
reached by him as a result of the experience, are purely personal
and not necessarily shared by all of his colleagues. Insofar as
the author of the present Introduct/ion is concerned, the work on
the Project has led to reflections/on a number of general prob-
lems which are unconnected, or only indirectly connected, with the
law of Formation of Contracts. The following remarks are an
attempt, in tentative and abbreviated form,3 6 to spell out a few
of these reflections, dealing with (aa) some of the differences
between the legal systems under consideration, with respect to
their sources and methods, and (bb) the process of comparison itself.
(aa) "Codified" vs. "uncodified" systems. As every part of
a legal system is apt to reflect some of that system's general
features,37 it is inevitable that a detailed comparative study of
a specific legal topic will make it possible, at least as a by-
product, to engage in some comparison between the various legal
systems with respect to their methods and sources. Those who
prepared the present Study, although dealing with a specific and
clearly defined subject, at every step were able to observe, and
tempted to compare, intriguing and often subtle differences in
style that exist among the legal systems under consideration. Only
a few of these stylistic points can be touched upon here, by way
of a brief comment on elements of strength and weakness exhibited
by "codified" and "uncodified" legal systems.
The first point to be stressed in this connection is that in
the literature on comparative law the words "codification" and
"codified" are almost invariably used too broadly, by being
applied to a whole legal system. To say that an entire system is
"codified" or "uncodified," may be meaningful as indicating a
general way of thinkingl but it can be misleading when one deals
3 6The author hopes to elaborate these somewhat disjointed ob-
servations in future writings.
3 7Concerning the related point--that no part of a legal sys-
tem can be correctly understood without some knowledge of its
general features--see infra under (bb).
wih a particular topic or area of the law. There is no highly
developed legal system in existence today which is either wholly
codified or wholly uncodified. In dealing with a particular
subject, therefore, one must inquire whether and to what extent
a given legal system has resorted to codificationowith respect to
that subject.
Concerning the formation of contracts, the line between
codified and uncodified legal systems cannot be'drawn in the sim-
ple terms of the traditional dichotomy between civil law and
common law. In France, a "civil law" country, there are prac-
tically no code provisions dealing with offer and acceptance;
thus the pertinent rules and principles had to be developed by
the courts and legal writers. In the United States, on the other
hand, in spite of its "common law" tradition, a substantial seg-
ment of the law of contracts today is cast'in the form of pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code and of other statutes; and
in the "common law" system of India the basic rules on the subject
are comprehensively (though not exhaustively) and rather syste-
matically laid out in the Indian Contract Act.
A comparison between codified and case law systemslshows that
both have their strong points, and that either system can be per-
fectly workable. Well-drafted code provisions, such as the Ger-
man or Italian provisions dealing with formation of contracts,
offer the advantage that they provide clear and authoritative
answers at least for those problems which arise most-frequently.
Of course, no draftsman of a code can foresee all possible fact
situations; but even in situations with which the code does not
deal directly, the code provisions may supply-convenient starting
points for the reasoning of judges and-legal scholars.
Another clear advantage of carefully prepared codes is
their relative wealth of gap-filling provisions (rules of ius
dispositivum). This can be of great significance in connection
with the question, among others, whether a-proposal or an agree-
ment meets the requirement of definiteness. See the Individual
Reports on A-3, §III.
The draftsmen of codes tend to-climb to higher levels of
abstraction than judicial law-makers. This was rather strikingly
illustrated in the work on the Cornell Project, It was:found that
some of the codes of the civil law world (which for this.purpose
includes the socialist world) deal with a number of the important
problems in this area by way of provisions of the'highest degree
of generality. For instance, the-question-of-whether-and how an
offer, an acceptance or a revocation-must-be-communicated to the
other party, will be treated in those systems, not under the head-
ings of "offer" or "acceptance" or "revocation," but under the
heading of "jural act" or "declaration of will." This technique
of abstraction, traceable-to the-General Partof'the°German Civil
Code and its Pandectist forefathersy'affectsnot-only the process
of looking up the law, but also the results reached; By speaking
in terms of such generality; the codifier is apt to-paint with
a wide brush, e.g., to make the same'rules applicable to the
communication of offers, of acceptances'andof-revocations. This
has the advantage that many questions are expressly'answered by
a single provision, and that instances-of the-casus-omissus are
reduced in number. On the other hand; the multiple solutions thus
mechanically fashioned at a single-stroke may not-be the best
ones. To this observer it seems very doubtful,-for example,
whether it is desirable to resolve all questions of-communication
in the same way regardless of whether one dealswith'the commun-
ication of offers, of acceptances-or-of-revocations. The legal
systems which do not employ code-provisions abstractly dealing
with the communication of "declarations of will;"'may be able
to work out subtler and more discriminating solutions.
While a well-drafted code-undoubtedly enhances certainty and
predictability of the law; the-present-Study also shows that a
workable system of law concerning formation-of-contracts can be
built up by judicial decisions,provided the decisions are ade-
quately reported, sufficiently-numerous to cover the more im-
portant aspects of the subject; and-followed with'reasonable
regularity. Implacable application of the:doctrine of-stare
decisis may, of course, create certain-rigidities; but rigidity
can arise also from a code provision which unambiguously lays
down an unjust or antiquated rule. In the United States, more-
over,the doctrine of stare decisis has.never'been-an-inflexible
one. Even in England, where the House of Lords in-1898 adopted a
com]etely rigid version-of the doctrine, such rigidity has now
been replaced by a somewhat less absolute approach.
Workable results may be-attained'also'by-various-combinations
of code and case methods. A "codified" version-of-what originally
was the English common law of contracts, has-on the'whole produced
satisfactory results in India. Neither the-statutory form of the
law nor the doctrine-of stare'decisis has-prevented'the Indian
courts from slowly adjusting the rules-to the-conditions of their
country. Further evolutionary-changes; -not-of*a-drastic nature and
probably to be brought about by statutory amendment, seem to be in
prospect. In the United States, the State of New York pioneered
in injecting a number of statutory elements into the common law
of contracts. In almost all states, contracts for the sale of
goods today are largely governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
while most other contracts are still essentially-subject to the
common law. The common law no doubt-will influence-the interpre-
tation of the relevant provisions of the UCC; conversely, the
innovations of the UCC may well lead the courts to analogous so-
lutions in cases not directly governed by the-Code;--Nobody anti-
cipates much difficulty in this respect. The-first'Tentative
Draft of the pertinent provisions of the-Restatement-Second shows
that systematicity does not necessarily suffer on-account of this
duality of sources, and in the end suchduality-may-turn out to
be an element of strength.
The conclusion to be derived from the foregoing'observations
appears to be that insofar as the-law of formation-of contracts
is concerned, a system may flourish by using the method of cod-
ification, or by relying on a method-of-authoritative and ade-
quately reported case law, or by combining-these-methods-in various
ways.
The only kind of method that-seems-to lead legal systems into
trouble is one that resorts neither to codification nor-to the
development of an authoritative bodyof'adequatelyreported ju-
dicial decisions. France, as has been mentioned, has-not codified
its law with respect to formation-of contracts. French. judicial
decisions, and especially the decisions'of the Cour deCassation,
are reported in such a way that the reader of the reports is not
reliably informed either of the facts-of the-case or-of the rea-
soning of the Court. Perhaps partly as-a result oftheir semi-
secret nature, the decisions of the-Cour de Cassation-have not
attained the same authoritative status which in practice is the
hallmark of the decisions of courts of-lastresort'in some of the
other civil law countries and in all'of the common law systems.
As is shown by the French Reports appearing in'these'volumes, the
Cour de Cassation itself has-been vacillating-in its "Jurispru-
dence" on a number of important points,°and the-lower-courts
often refuse to follow the leadership of the'Cour de Cassation,
especially when prominent academic voices-oppose the latest
solution announced by the highest-court: The result; as can be
gathered from .the painstaking'analyses contained'in the French
Reports, is that in this area the French legal-system-has suffered
some loss of certainty and-predictability, even-with respect to
basic issues which in other civil law systems as-well-as in common
law systems have been authoritatively resolvedi -If-any.lesson is
to be drawn from this observation, it is not at all-limited to
France, and relates more to general-problems-of-legal method than
to the specifics-of formation of contracts.
(bb) Concerning the process of-comparison; many-observations
of a general nature have been incorporated-into-the'description
of the Project's own methods'(supra; Part ii-(4)-of-this.Intro-
duction). These observations will not be repeated here. The
few comments which follow will deal only with'some-of-the hurdles
which actually or supposedly tend to-impede-the-comparative pro-
cess.
When data taken from several legal systems are'sought to
be compared, the first difficulty'arises-from-the fact that the
person asked to do the comparing--whether he be the author or
the reader--is unable correctly-to understand'and-to-appraise
the data relating to legal systems with the-methods and.organiza-
tion of which he is unfamiliar. Citations'of'judicialldecisions,
for example, are. apt to convey'little'meaning;,or perhaps an in-
accurate meaning, to such a-person unless he'knows-exactly how
such decisions are reportedin-the-country-in~question (whether,
in particular, the reports-fully state the'facts'and therea-
soning of the Court); 38 and-what-force'they-have-as-precedents.
The well-known generalities, usually phrased-in-terms of diff-
erences between "common law" and "civil law," are'not helpful,
38See Gorla, loc; cit;-supra n: 33.
because the common law systems, and even-more the-civil law sys-
tems, show very substantial differences within'the-group.39 The
participants in the Cornell Project'found-it valuable;-and indeed
indispensable, to educate each-other-on-the-history;-the sources,
the classificatory scheme and other general-features-of the legal
systems under consideration; and-to-do-so-at-an*early-stage of the
proceedings. By the same token,-in'order-to-enable-the reader of
these volumes to evaluate the citations of'authorities-as well as
the textual statements in their Individual*Reports; thereporters
thought it necessary-briefly to set forth the'same-kind.of in-
formation in the "Introductions" to-each'set-of-national reports
(infra pp. 193-323).
A related difficulty, experienced in-almost-every session of
the Cornell Project and referred to in many-of-the-General.Reports,
stems from the interplay between-substantive-and adjective law.4o
In making comparisons between-substantive-rules-applicable to
certain "fact" situations, one-must not-forget-that-some "facts"
may be provable in the courts of-one-country'but-perhaps not in
the courts of another. Even more-important,-at-least-in the con-
text of formation of contracts;-isarealization-that the-line
between questions of law and questions of fact(i)-s-differently
drawn and (ii) has different significance-in'various-legal.systems.
In general, it seems that the civil law systems;-which never em-
ploy a jury in civil cases and normally permit a complete re-
hearing on the facts before an intermediate appellate'court, tend
to treat as factual many issues which in the'view-of'the.common
law would be issues of law, to be determined-by-the'trial judge
rather than the jury and reviewable in all appellate'courts,
including courts of last resort.4 1 This tendency'tofactualize
issues, especially those relating-to-the-meaning-of documents
and generally to the "intention of the parties,"-appears to be
3 9See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 316-17 (2d ed. 1959).
40 Although legal systems differ on-this-point of classifi-
cation, the term "adjective law" is here-used-as including the law
of evidence.
41See SCHLESINGER, op cit. supra n; 39yat-229, 314.
particularly strong in-France.
Where legal systems thus-diverge-from each-other in their
treatment of the law-fact-dichotomy, the-comparativist may be
exposed to a booby trap. If, for instance,-he'finds-that-on the
same facts the New York Court-of Appeals and the French Cour de
Cassation have reached the same result, he may-be tempted to ex-
claim that the New York rule and-French-rule-are identical; but
he is proved wrong if upon-closer inspection-it'turns out that
the New York court laid down'a-rule of-law;-while the Cour de
Cassation merely refused to disturb-a factual'finding, implying
that a contrary findings-mthat may'be'made-by-the'"judges of the
facts"in the next case--willremain-equally-undisturbed. As the
General Reports show, the participants-in'the-present'Study were
on their guard against this-particular-booby-.trap; -it is not
claimed, however, that they succeeded in-avoiding-it'each and
every time.
Mention s1culd be made; on the other hand,-of-a-supposed
hurdle on the path to comparison-which-in-the-workof'the Cornell
Project caused less difficulty than-might'have-been-anticipated.
As is well known, thelegal'systems'considered-in'this'Study differ
quite radically from each other-in the way in which-they organize
the field of contract law. Some of the civil-law'systems draw a
systematic distinction between-1"civil" and-"commercial"-contracts;
others do not. The civil-law-countries; moreover,-normally divide
the law of contracts into a general and a-special-part, the
latter dealing with particular types of contracts. 4 2 In common
law systems, on the other hand, there-is'no separate."commercial
law,,,43 and as a rule no "special part" clearly separated from
42In some of the civil law systems; the-rules-applicable to
contracts must be looked-for on'three-levels-of abstraction. In
addition to the general and-special-rules-of'contract-law, there
is a third set of rules, even more-abstract-than the'"general"
contract rules, dealing with"jural acts" and-"declarations of
will." Concerning the effect-of these'lastm-mentioned, super-
abstract rules, see-supra, text'under-(aa).
43The American Uniform-Commercial-Code'has-not'adopted the
civil law dichotomy between-"civil" and-"commercial"'transactions.
See Schlesinger, The Uniform'Commercial-Code'in the-Light of
Comparative'Law, 1 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV.11 (1959).
the general law of contracts;but-by'way-of a-dividing-line which
cuts across the two civil law-distinctions-just-mentionea; most
common law jurisdictions subject-contracts-for the sale of.goods
to comprehensive statutory'regulation. Frequently;-special-statutes
also modify the common law'with respect-to-other'particular types
of contracts, such as insurance-contracts. In-the'socialist sys-
tems, as has been pointed out-above, yet'another-scheme of organ-
ization has been adopted; and the dividing-lines-there used differ
from those of both the civil and the common-law.
To overcome the problems posed-by these'differences in or-
ganization and classification, did not-prove overly-difficult. The
factual approach,4 4 it turned out, cut right-through the conceptual
cubicles in which each'legal system stores its'law-of contracts,4 5
and made it possible to proceed immediately-to the-matching of
the results reached by the various legal-systems.
Having thus freed itself of'the-shackles-of-existing.class-
ificatory systems, the group had-to-develop'its-own-scheme of
organization and of classification-when-at-a-later-stage-of its
work it was faced with the task'of-formulating the-General.Re-
ports. This was a most difficult job; but-the'difficulty was not
insupeiable, because at that stage'the instances-ofagreemhent and
44See supra Part Ii (4) of this Introduction.
45One problem of this kind that-proved somewhat-thorny, arose
in connection with options. The common law'systems-and-some of the
civil law systems have developed-general rules'onthe-shbject.
Other civil law systems, however, rely-in-part-on-detailed special
rules concerning particulartypes of optionsor-of'similar rights,
such as the right or pre-emption or-of re-purchase; and often
encounter doubtful and controversial questions-as to'whether these
special rules should be analogically extended-toother kinds of
options. Although the point may not-beofcadinalimportance
with respect to formation of contracts, it had-to-be-clearly under-
stood by all before any general'statements-dealing'with options
could be made, and it turned'out-that-to-overcome-this'particular
classificatory difference was-a-somewhat'time-consumtng process.
It would have been even-more time-consuming-if the'group had not
had the benefit of the clear'analysis presentedby'Lorenz, Vor-
zugsrechte beim Vertragsabschluss,°inlFESTSCHRIFT FUR HANSDLLE
103 ff. (193.
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of disagreement among-legal-systems-were already-known; and the
question was only one-of-fashioning-a-sultable-mold- nto.which to
pour these known'data: *An existing-mold-was-used;"perhaps by way
of whoosing one of several'divergent-ones;-whenever-itwas possible
to do so without causing inaccuracies-or-misunderstandings. But
when it seemed necessary; the group did not-hesitate-tp~devise
new categories;46-thus'building-some'new-elements-into-a-systematic
structure largely consisting-of-familiar-components.
46For an*example, see'Gen; Rept.'on-A-ll;'§II; Concerning
the use of new terms, sde supra, at the end of-PartII(4)(d) of
this Introduction.
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